

School of Theology at Claremont



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THE RELATION OF INTELLECTUAL POWER
TO MAN'S TRUE PERFECTION,

CONSIDERED IN

TWO ESSAYS

READ BEFORE

THE ENGLISH ACADEMY OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION.

PUBLISHED,

With Notes and Appendices,

BY DESIRE OF

THE CARDINAL ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER
AND THE ACADEMY.

BY

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, D. PH.

LONDON:

BURNS AND LAMBERT, 17 PORTMAN STREET,
AND 63 PATERNOSTER ROW.

1862.

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PREFACE.

I TRUST and think, that the two following Essays will be fully intelligible, if read as they stand. But as a few Catholics have objected to various statements contained in them, it is probable enough that some, after having read them through, may be desirous of carefully examining the truths of those statements. With a view to such a contingency, it is better at once to explain, that the arrangement of the two Essays is not only not scientific, but is essentially the reverse. The greater part of the second Essay was written, with the express purpose of drawing out in an explicit form various propositions, which had been implied and understood in the first: the greater part therefore of the later Essay precedes, in scientific order, any part of the earlier. For those, then, who may wish thoroughly to examine the very important matter which is at issue, it will be convenient that I should here state, in due order of arrangement, the various questions which present themselves for consideration.

I remark, by way of preliminary explanation, that throughout the two Essays I use the words 'intellect' and 'intellectual,' in the sense which I have explained in pp. 4, 5, and again, from p. 33 to p. 39.

This being carefully borne in mind, the first ques-

tion which presents itself is this. Supposing God to have endowed any of us with a powerful intellect, is it or is it not His Wish, in so endowing us, that we should aim earnestly at making our intellectual labour an instrument for promoting our interior piety? Is it or is it not true, that the more we do this, precisely so much the more do we fulfil the one end of our creation? What is meant by making our intellectual labour an instrument in promoting our interior piety, I have explained (I hope sufficiently) from p. 43 to p. 46. The chief reasons for my own determination of this question, will be found from p. 39 to p. 42. I may also refer, for the same purpose, to a passage from p. 21 to p. 23.

The second question will be, whether I have truly stated, that one man makes a nearer approach than another towards fulfilling the end of his creation, in precise proportion as he is more intimately united to God by the pious dispositions of his will. See pp. 42, 43.

The third question will be, whether I am correct in saying, that the answer, which I give to the two first, is implied for certain in the Church's doctrine and practice. My reasons for this statement will be found from p. 6 to p. 11.

The fourth question will be, whether I have rightly alleged, that certain most serious dangers are to be apprehended, in the case of able and original thinkers, whose intellect is not spiritually regulated and controlled. My allegations, together with the basis on which they rest, are detailed from p. 26 to p. 29, and from p. 54 to p. 71.

As these four questions are prior in scientific order, so also they are of far superior importance, to the remaining three. I may add also, that the first and fourth are of all the most fundamental and momentous.

The fifth question will be, whether the doctrine, contained in my answer to the first two, be rightly and catholically expressed, as I have expressed it; viz. by saying, that man's perfection consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature, intellectual excellence having no part in it whatever. This question is specially considered from p. 47 to p. 49, and in Appendix B.

The sixth question will be, whether my use of the word 'intellect' is in accordance with the ordinary and popular acceptation of the term here in England. This is treated from p. 35 to p. 38.

The seventh and last question will be, whether those who appertain to what I have called the 'anti-Catholic' schools of thought, really hold such opinions, as those attributed to them in my first Essay. What I mean by the 'anti-Catholic schools of thought,' is stated from p. 1 to p. 3: and two or three objectors have considered me as very unfair to such thinkers, in the comments which I have made. I admit most fully, that I have far less right to be confident on this question, than on any of the preceding; because the objectors have far greater acquaintance with anti-Catholic literature, than any to which I can lay claim. For this reason, I am particularly desirous of drawing attention to the obvious fact, that the answer, which we give to the other questions

above recited, cannot depend in the slightest degree on the answer which we give to this. It will also be better, if I take the present opportunity of explaining, as precisely as I can, the charges which I bring against anti-Catholic thinkers.

In the first place, I cannot but feel very confident, that they are all most violently at issue with the answer which I give, to the two first questions of those above recited; and which I maintain to be the only true and Catholic answer. Indeed, it is just because the Church does practically give such answer, that they regard her as fettering the intellect and enslaving the soul. This is the essential contrast of view, to which I draw attention in my first Essay.

But it is objected, that they would frankly make an admission, with which I have not duly credited them. They would all admit, it is alleged, that intellectual power deserves no respect simply for its own sake; but exclusively so far as it is directed to some end, which they regard as virtuous or beneficial. Now I am quite prepared to believe, that some of them (though certainly not all),* *so far as words go*, would make this admission: indeed the refusal to make it would be so monstrously unreasonable, that they might shrink from such refusal for fear of damaging their cause. But I certainly have the very strongest impression, that the immense majority of them hold implicitly a most opposite view; that they look up to vast intellectual power, as deserving (in itself and for

* The passage quoted from Sir W. Hamilton, in p. 80, abundantly justifies me in this qualification.

its own sake) their deep homage and reverence. No one, of course, will doubt, that this judgment is implied in Lord Brougham's words, quoted in p. 20. Now I have the very strongest impression, that the same state of mind is almost universal in the class of men whom I assail.

Nor can I admit that this doctrine of theirs is in any respect less noxious, because it is not explicitly avowed or reflected on. Ninety-nine hundredths of the influence, whether for good or evil, which we exercise over the opinions of our fellow-men, acts on them, not through any principle which we *state*, but through those principles which we *imply*. How is it that a good mother trains her children, in the fear and love of God, and in hatred of the world? Certainly not by her formal catechisings, nor by the pious sentiments which she orthodoxly expresses; but by a most different means. In proportion as her children practically recognise, that their growth in piety is the one fact concerning them, for which she is primarily and mainly solicitous;—in proportion as they unconsciously observe in her daily course of action, that this life is felt by her as literally of no importance, except in its bearing on the next;—in that proportion (if they are faithful to grace) do the same holy principles become deeply and securely rooted in their own hearts. And evil principles, no less than good, are disseminated, not by what we profess or think ourselves to hold, but by what we really do hold.* If therefore intellectual power be habitually spoken of in that

* I have hinted this in p. 63 and p. 65. I may be allowed to quote two

reverential tone, which is not exemplified indeed but caricatured by Lord Brougham's wild extravagance,—no number of theoretical admissions on the other side will have any effect whatever, even in modifying the necessary result. The impression will prevail, as the effect of such a tone, that intellectual excellence is in itself in-

passages of the same drift, from a paper on Catholic Education, which I published a year since.

“Suppose I had to choose between these two alternative evils. Suppose I were obliged, either to send my son into some society where the doctrines of Christianity are openly and avowedly attacked; or else into one, in which they are not formally mentioned, but in which every thing, said and implied on the various topics of conversation, goes upon a view of things utterly anti-Christian. If we further suppose that in neither of these cases indecency and scurrility of language finds entrance, every one (I think) would rather allow his son to be in the former than in the latter. In the former, the open avowal of disbelief puts him on his guard, and throws him into a combative attitude; he regards, therefore, their words with distrust and dislike. Again, he may report the propositions which he has heard to Christian advisers, and learn the true answer to such propositions. But in the latter, he imbibes he knows not what; maxims find access to his convictions, which, had they been nakedly expressed, would have disgusted and revolted him; he becomes a semi-infidel, before he even suspects the process through which he has been passing.

* * * * *

“Every one who has had any concern with religious education, knows very well where lies the chief difficulty. The taught are generally most ready to accept and take for granted the doctrines and principles which their teachers inculcate. What they are very slow to do, is to understand the meaning of these doctrines and principles, as translated into the language of every-day life; to see what course of action or thought is implied in these principles, under the various circumstances in which they are placed through the day; to apprehend what is the judgment which those principles logically require them to form, on the various facts which surround them and come before their cognisance. And this being so, no religious teachers are content with laying before the mind certain great truths in chapel or at catechism. They are most anxious that these lessons shall be practically brought home to the youthful mind, in their full concrete force and application, by the various influences of familiar conversation and practical example. Unless this be done, abstract and theoretical religious instruction is hardly more than a mockery and a sham.”

trinsecally great and noble; or in other words, that a quality is in itself great and noble, which is possessed by the devils in a greater degree than by the ablest of us all. See p. 29.

These then are the two charges which I make. Firstly, all able and original anti-Catholic thinkers would expressly deny the Catholic proposition, that intellectual excellence forms no part whatever of man's true perfection. Secondly, the immense majority of them hold the implicit belief, that great intellectual power is in itself worthy of homage and reverence, quite apart from all question of the use to which it is put. Now I know not whether any Catholics exist, possessing a wide acquaintance with non-Catholic literature,—who on the one hand sympathise altogether with the principles expressed in the following Essays;—but who on the other hand think, that many anti-Catholics approach far nearer to these principles, than I have been in the habit of supposing. If there be such, I readily admit that their opinion deserves my most careful consideration; and that my impression will be far less confident than it now is, that I have judged anti-Catholics fairly. Meanwhile however I may observe, that F. Newman at least possesses the widest possible acquaintance with non-Catholic literature; and that nothing which I have said, in disparagement of these men, approaches to *his* severity of judgment. It will be observed also, that he makes the very distinction which I do, (p. 3), between the earlier Protestants, and those of the present day. I refer to the following remarkable passage.

“When I am told by *the partisans of mixed education*, that human

science leads to ■ belief in a Supreme Being, . . . I am obliged to ask, what the statement means in *their* mouth : what they, the speakers, mean by the word ‘God.’ Let me not be thought offensive, if I question whether it means the same thing on the two sides of the controversy. With us Catholics, *as with the first race of Protestants*, as with Mahometans and all Theists, the word contains a theology in itself.”

Then, after stating the chief heads of that theology, he proceeds :

“I should have difficulty in believing, that a doctrine so mysterious, so peremptory, approved itself as a matter of course to *educated men of this day*, who gave their minds attentively to consider it. . . . I cannot take it for granted . . . that the spirit of this age means by the Supreme Being what Catholics mean. Nay, it would be a relief to my mind to gain some ground of assurance, that the parties influenced by that spirit had, *I will not say a true apprehension of God, but even so much as the idea of what a true apprehension is.*” *Discourses on University Education*, pp. 58, 60.

I have no more to say by way of preface, except that the two Essays are published, almost exactly as they were read. There are but two changes of the slightest importance : in the first Essay I have, in six or seven places, made the change of expression mentioned in the note to p. 86 ; and in the second Essay (pp. 42, 43) I have introduced three or four additional sentences, to make my meaning clearer. In those sentences, however, I have observed (since the sheets were worked off) one carelessness of expression, which may possibly cause misconception. By the words ‘no one ever thought’ (p. 42) I mean ‘no *Catholic* ever thought ;’ as the drift of my argument will sufficiently show.

London, Sexagesima Sunday, 1862.

CONTENTS.

ESSAY THE FIRST.

ON THE POSITION ASSIGNED TO INTELLECT IN THE CATHOLIC AND ANTI-CATHOLIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT RESPECTIVELY.

	PAGE
I. What are meant by the anti-Catholic schools of thought? .	1
II. Distinction between two widely different senses of the word ‘intellect’	4
III. Two propositions on the place assigned to intellect by the Catholic Church	5
IV. The former of these propositions shown to be implied in Catholic doctrine and practice	6
V. The latter of these propositions shown to be implied in Catholic doctrine and practice	11
VI. Anti-Catholic doctrine on the subject, stated at its greatest possible advantage	12
VII. Criticism on that school, which in England has laid greatest stress on bodily well-being	13
VIII. Criticism on anti-Catholic schools of thought in general, as to their appreciation, whether of moral or intellectual excellence	17
IX. Reason pronounces clearly for the Catholic decision . . .	21
X. Recapitulation of the argument	23
XI. Inference drawn from what has been said, in regard to our controversy with anti-Catholic thinkers	25
XII. Inference drawn from Catholic doctrine in general, on the fearful danger of intellectual pride	26
XIII. Proposed subject for a succeeding Essay	30

ESSAY THE SECOND.

ON THE DANGERS TO BE APPREHENDED FROM INTELLECT, WHEN NOT
SPIRITUALLY REGULATED AND CONTROLLED.

	PAGE
I. Introduction	32
II. The vigorous cultivation of intellect ■ sacred duty, in the case of intellectual men	33
III. Renewed consideration of the two senses in which this word 'intellect' is used	ib.
IV. Further explanation of the statement, that man's perfection consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature ; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever	39
V. Three important results obtained at this stage of the argu- ment	46
VI. Unanimous consent of theologians	47
VII. Reply to various objections	48
VIII. Certainty that very serious evil must result, where a power- ful intellect is exercised, without subjection to spiritual regulation and control	54
IX. One special evil : the pursuing intellectual exercises, for the sake (not of possessing truth, but) of obtaining intellectual amusement. Sir William Hamilton cited in illustration	55
X. Particular manifestation of this evil, in those whose studies are theological	58
XI. Intellectual pride tends also to the same mischievous re- sult	61
XII. Particular manifestation of this evil, in Catholics who study history and politics	62
XIII. An objection anticipated and answered	71
XIV. Conclusion	73

APPENDIX A.

Some few passages illustrative of the Protestant view . . .	PAGE 75
---	------------

APPENDIX B.

Answer to theological objections, and somewhat fuller remarks on the consent of theologians	80
--	----

APPENDIX C.

On a passage from Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics .	94
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ESSAY THE FIRST.

ON THE POSITION ASSIGNED TO INTELLECT IN THE CATHOLIC
AND ANTI-CATHOLIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT RESPECTIVELY.

I.

HOWEVER serious may be the mistakes into which Dr. Brownson has occasionally fallen, there is at least one counsel, urged by him of late with much prominence, which is, I think, undoubtedly both well-timed and very important. He has been exhorting Catholics to give much more attention, in their controversial works, to the errors specially characteristic of the present time, than to the comparatively exploded heresies of Luther and Calvin. And he says with much point, that if the most dangerous enemies of the Church hold really the same opinions now, which her most dangerous enemies held three hundred years ago, it would seem as though error possessed those attributes of permanence and unchangeableness, which we prize as the special characteristics of truth.

In expressing my agreement with this opinion, I confine my remarks to these islands; having, unfortunately, no acquaintance with the course of thought elsewhere. And as to these islands, I am very far from meaning, that the more old-fashioned controversial works have now lost their importance. Great numbers are

still most warmly attached to Lutheran or Calvinistic Protestantism; and it is very desirable, therefore, that a Catholic should know how to deal with such men. But I think it will be admitted, on consideration, that no men of great power, vigour, originality of mind, are found in their number. I think it will be admitted, that at this time non-Catholics, possessed of power, vigour, originality, either expend their intellectual energy on matters wholly alien to religion, or else hold religious theories, which are not less than fundamentally at variance with what I may call the time-honoured forms of Protestantism. Lord Macaulay is an instance of the first kind; of those who have expended their intellectual energy on matters alien to theology. He accepted, I suppose, without much question, great part of his traditional religion; but it is plain to every one, that he had no real interest in its peculiarities, and that he employed his remarkable powers on matters of a very different nature. The same thing is true in its degree of very different men—men eminent in metaphysics and mental science—Sir W. Hamilton, M'Cosh, Calderwood: who seem to have clung faithfully, on the whole, to the creed in which they were educated; but have most certainly never devoted their intellectual activity, to an examination of its grounds, or an illustration of its doctrines. And much more evidently this class includes the many, who have given themselves wholly to mathematical and physical science. On the other hand, Kingsley, Maurice, Jowett, Stanley, Goldwin Smith, Martineau, Carlyle, Buckle, Grote, Mill,—here are men who have applied their mind vigorously to the question, what shall be their religion, if any. Each name among them calls up its own separate associations, and they represent a considerable body. Many such men are

earnest advocates of Christianity, in some sense of their own; many adhere at least to the great doctrines of Theism; while several, and a larger number (I believe) than is commonly supposed, are simply atheists. But none of them can be assigned to any traditional form of Protestantism.

In this brief review I have not considered the question, how far there are still men of vigorous intellectual power, in the Oxford school founded by F. Newman. But putting aside these, if there are such, I consider all other able and powerful thinkers, external to the Church, as appertaining to the present anti-Catholic schools of thought. These men, amidst all their very serious differences, agree with each other, while differing from those whose heart is with the older Protestantism, as in other important particulars, so also in their attitude towards the Church. The older Protestant schools regarded us with fanatical hatred; these men rather with supercilious contempt. Or if they *do* hate us, it is on totally different grounds from the older school. The old Calvinists and Lutherans abhorred the Church, as a crafty, powerful, malignant conspiracy, banded together for the promotion of idolatry and immorality; and their abhorrence was in no small degree mixed with fear. But these new anti-Catholics, so far as they hate the Church at all, hate her on intellectual grounds; they hate her as teaching principles, which fetter the intellect and enslave the soul.

It will be naturally anticipated, that as these new schools are thus in accordance on their ground of opposition to the Church, so they will also be in accordance on various positive tenets. And this will be found the case: there is more than one important principle, on which they agree with each other, while differing both

from the older Protestants and from the Catholic Church. Of these principles, there is none, I think, so important and fundamental, as that which I ask you to consider this afternoon. These later anti-Catholic schools of thought are in accordance with each other, and in widest variance from the Catholic Church, as to the position which they assign to intellect.

II.

But before entering on my argument, I must beg you to observe that this word "intellect" is used in two most different senses. And it is the more important that we fully understand this, as from a confusion of these two senses, has arisen what seems to me the most mischievous possible misapprehension, of one prominent particular in St. Thomas's Theology. In the theological and strict philosophical sense of the term, a man exercises his intellect, precisely so far as he contemplates real or apparent truth: in the ordinary and popular sense, in which I am here using the word, he exercises his intellect, so far only as he busies his mind with philosophical and scientific processes. Now how widely divergent are these two senses, one single illustration will abundantly show.

Let me suppose, *e. g.*, a man in the lower ranks of society, who has received, as we should say, no intellectual cultivation whatever, but who is deeply pious and interior; who fixes his thoughts through the day on the invisible world, or, as St. Paul would express it, lives by faith. He is constantly eliciting acts of faith; and it is a first principle in Catholic theology, that an act of faith is an intellectual act. If we use the word "intellect" then, in its theological and strict philoso-

phical sense, this pious rustic is exercising his intellect constantly through the day: nay, he is exercising it in its very highest exercise; for he is contemplating not apparent but real truth, not natural truth but supernatural. Yet it is precisely of such a man as this, that every one would say that he has not been exercising his *intellect* at all; that he cultivates his moral and spiritual nature indeed, but not his intellectual. .

Let me say, then, once for all, that throughout this paper I use the word "intellect," *not* in its theological and strict philosophical sense, *but* in its ordinary and popular acceptation. I speak of a man using his intellect, so far as he is occupied with such processes as these: investigating evidence; analysing his various convictions, and exploring their grounds; contemplating scientifically the phenomena, whether of his own mind or of the external world; carrying premisses forward to their conclusions; viewing a large field of truth in the mutual relation of its component parts; and the like. This, I say, is the ordinary and popular acceptation of the term. When we speak of intellectual discipline, we do not mean a discipline which shall train us in the habit of fixing our thoughts firmly and keenly on supernatural truth; but a discipline which shall train us in the habit of performing well such exercises as I have just recounted.

III.

I say, then, that intellect, using that word in its ordinary and popular acceptation, has a position in the modern anti-Catholic schools of thought, most different from that assigned to it by Catholic doctrine, and most different, therefore, from its true position. It seems to

me so very important that we should distinctly recognise this fact, and make it familiar to our thoughts and imagination, that I will content myself in this paper with a very narrow range of subject. I will hardly attempt more, than simply to place this contrast before you as clearly as I can, and to show that reason is plainly and undeniably on the Catholic side in the controversy. I will then merely append one or two obvious inferences, and so conclude.

First, then, what is the exact place assigned to intellect by the Catholic Church? The two following propositions are beyond question implied in Catholic doctrine and practice.—(1) The perfection of man consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever. (2) The intellect, however, can afford most important service, towards promoting the spiritual welfare of mankind.

IV.

It is the former of these two propositions, which is so violently opposed to the most cherished notions of our opponents. It is so elementary a part of our religion indeed, that it is expressed in the very second answer of the Catechism. “Why did God make you? To know Him, love Him, and serve Him in this world, and to be happy with Him in the next.” And perhaps I should make an apology for detaining you, while I adduce proof that my proposition does express the one Catholic doctrine. But I have found, to my extreme surprise, one or two Catholics, who are not prepared to accept the statement. And besides, I am very confident that as time goes on, this one question will be more and more

found to be the deepest point at issue between Catholic and anti-Catholic thinkers. It will be better, therefore, to be prepared in time for the combat, and to refresh our memory and convictions on the whole subject. Without further apology then, I will place before you some few of the grounds, which make it so certain that the Church's doctrine is such as I have described; though any thing like a full exposition of them would, by itself alone, occupy far more time than we have at command.

Let me repeat my proposition. The perfection of man consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence forming no part of it whatever. I am now maintaining, that this proposition is undoubtedly implied in Catholic doctrine and practice.

First, I appeal to the Foundation of St. Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises. It is difficult to imagine any pronouncement, short of a distinct dogmatical decree, more infallibly declaratory of the Church's mind than this Foundation. All religious and most priests yearly go through these Exercises, as the very basis of their whole interior life. And that to which I appeal, is no accidental or subordinate portion of these Exercises, but the one foundation on which the whole is built. If this foundation be rotten, the whole edifice falls to the ground. Or in other words, if the doctrine which I am about to recite be not true, the whole body of these Exercises, solemnly approved by Sovereign Pontiffs and adopted by the whole Church, is one complicated machine for instilling poisonous error.

Now for my quotation. "Principle and foundation:" that is, of the whole Exercises. "Man has been created, that he may praise the Lord his God, and show Him reverence, and serve Him, and by means of this save his

soul." Now it will be admitted by all, that man arrives at his personal perfection, in proportion as he achieves the end for which he has been created: according to St. Ignatius therefore, he arrives at his personal perfection, in proportion as he is more prompt and disposed to praise, reverence, and serve God. But he is more prompt and disposed to do these things, in proportion as he has more accustomed himself to live in the constant remembrance of God; or, in other words, in proportion as he has more sedulously cultivated his moral and spiritual nature. Hence, according to St. Ignatius, man arrives more nearly to his personal perfection, precisely in proportion as he more sedulously cultivates piety and spirituality.

Presently St. Ignatius adds, that "we should not wish on our part for health rather than for sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honour rather than ignominy, and *so on accordingly in all other things (consequenter in cæteris omnibus)*; desiring and choosing those things alone, which are more expedient to us for the end for which we have been created." Now let me suppose any one to admit, that we should be indifferent between health and sickness, between wealth and poverty; he certainly will not deny, that we should be equally indifferent between great and small intellectual power. Or if any one *were* to attempt so strange a distinction, St. Ignatius's words would preclude the comment; for he says that in *all* other things we are to act similarly, wishing and choosing those which more conduce to our true end. Intellectual power, I say, just as bodily health or temporal well-being, is to be desired just insomuch, as it may be the means of our spiritual perfection.*

* I have translated from F. Roothaan's edition, which is considered, I

You will object, that St. Ignatius does not lay this down as a precept. Of course not; no one ever thought he did: he lays it down as the one way of perfection, to aim at acquiring this indifference. Nor does my argument require more. It cannot be more perfect, to abstain from prizing for its own sake that which is an integral part of our perfection. But it is more perfect, according to St. Ignatius, to abstain from prizing for its own sake intellectual excellence: hence, according to St. Ignatius, intellectual excellence is not an integral part of our perfection.

From St. Ignatius I pass to St. Thomas, who will not be considered, I suppose, indifferent to the just claims of intellect. He tells us that the perfection of Christian life consists, essentially in love for God and man, instrumentally in practising the Evangelical Counsels. It will be abundantly plain to any one, who reads his discussion on perfection in the 2^a 2^æ, that the very notion of intellectual excellence having any kind of part in the matter, had never occurred to him, as we say, in his very dreams. And what is true of him, is true of all theologians, I believe, without a single exception. They

believe, the most authentic. The first passage runs thus: "Homo creatus est, ut laudet Deum Dominum nostrum, eique serviat, et per hæc salvet animam suam." And in a note on the words 'per hæc' F. Roothaan thus explains them: "'Hæc agendo;' 'his mediis:' Gallicè 'moyennant cela;' nempè laudando, reverentiam exhibendo, et serviendo." The second passage runs thus: "Adeò ut non velimus ex parte nostrâ magis sanitatem quàm infirmitatem, divitias quàm paupertatem, honorem quàm ignominiam, vitam longam quàm brevem, et consequenter in cæteris omnibus; unicè desiderando et eligendo ea, quæ magis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus." And in a note on the words, "consequenter in cæteris omnibus," F. Roothaan gives the very same instance which is in my text: "His verbis necessitas ista 'exhibendi nos indifferentes' extenditur ad alia omnia, quæ fortè ad quatuor illa genera reduci non possunt: *et sanè sunt quamplurima. Profectò indifferentiæ hujus exercendæ materia sunt etiam talenta ac dotes naturales, plures, pauciores,*" &c. &c. See Essay the Second, pp. 39-46.

do not expressly *oppose* the opinion which would count intellectual excellence as part of human perfection, simply because, to all appearance, they had never heard of, nor imagined, any such opinion.*

Thirdly, I argue from Catholic doctrine. It will be admitted (1) that those acts which God most approves in us, must be those which most lead to the end for which He created us; and (2) that those to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward, must be those which He most approves. Now, what are those acts to which He has promised a Heavenly Reward? Free supernatural acts of the will, and none others whatever. Let me suppose two Christian philosophers, who are both occupied in some theoretical speculation, and that for some good supernatural motive. Let me suppose that both have the same degree of Habitual Grace, and that both are aiming at the same supernatural end, with the same degree of efficacy. It is absolutely certain, that to both acts God promises an equal reward. Yet one of these philosophers may be originating the most true and profound speculations, while the other's theories are quite feeble and commonplace. I say that so long as this intellectual feebleness does not arise from the will's fault, so long as the will adheres in the same degree to its supernatural motive, the merit of the act is in no way affected. But if God promises an equal reward to both these acts, He equally approves them both; if He equally approves them both, they tend equally to the end for which He created us; if they tend equally to the end for which we were created, they tend equally to our personal perfection. But they tend most unequally to in-

* This argument, from the consent of theologians, will be found further developed in the second Essay, and in Appendix B.

tellectual excellence: hence intellectual excellence has no part in our personal perfection.

My fourth argument is but a development of the third. The Church has decided what kind of men they are, who have attained in most exalted measure their personal perfection: they are those Saints in Heaven, whom she proposes for our veneration. Several of these have possessed most eminent intellectual attainments; but who was ever so insane as to suppose, that these intellectual attainments constituted an integral part of their sanctity? In what process of canonisation was an inquiry ever instituted, into the philosophical or other intellectual attainments possessed by the servant of God? How far he was ready in understanding an opponent, and quick in answering him; how far he was accurate in analysing the phenomena of his own mind; how far he possessed vigorous powers of systematising and reasoning. You might just as plausibly say, that a man's strength of muscle or beauty of person will help him to canonisation, as that his intellectual power will have any such tendency.

V.

I have now brought forward as much proof as time will permit, for my first proposition: on my second, a very few words will suffice. Catholic doctrine and practice, I say, imply the proposition, that intellect can render most important service, in promoting the spiritual welfare of mankind. This is most evident, from the ready welcome and earnest encouragement given by the Church in every age, to those who will employ the very highest intellectual gifts in her service; in the analysis, illustration, and development of her doctrine, and other-

wise in the promotion of her interests. Indeed, taking into account all the various successive ages of Christianity, so far as my own extremely narrow reading warrants me in having an opinion, the superiority of intellect on the Church's side seems to me most striking and conspicuous. I have difficulty in imagining, *e. g.*, that any candid person would put even so profound a thinker as Kant, at all on the same intellectual level with St. Augustine, St. Thomas, or Vasquez; and if I had any sufficient knowledge of Scotus, I could no doubt add his name to the number.

VI.

Now it is the first of these two propositions, which stands out in such striking contrast with the doctrine held by the later anti-Catholics. This doctrine may be stated at its greatest advantage, and, indeed, not without considerable plausibility, as follows. Man's nature, it may be said, is complex, not simple; it consists not of will alone, but of intellect also and body, to mention no other constituents. Our perfection consists, not in the perfection of one part, but of every part: a well-disposed will is an element, no doubt, in human perfection; but intellectual vigour is another element, and bodily well-being a third. Here, then, we see the contrast which is to be considered; and no one will say that I have stated it unfairly to our antagonists. Anti-Catholics regard our perfection as consisting in the co-ordinate perfection of the various parts of our nature; Catholics place it in *subordination* of all the rest to one, viz. to the moral and spiritual part.*

* See the earlier part of Appendix A.

VII.

My direct and immediate argument is concerned with that opinion only, which regards *intellectual* excellence as an integral element in human perfection; but I shall be able to lay a somewhat important foundation for that argument, if I first briefly refer to those, who have brought into special notice the claims of bodily well-being to be so considered. These, so far as England is concerned, are particularly the advocates of what is called by its opponents muscular Christianity.* Such men express or imply the principle just stated, in disparagement of the austerities practised by the Church's Saints. "Is not the body," they seem to ask, "a part of human nature, as well as the soul? Perfection consists in the good condition of both. What right have you to sacrifice one, in the supposed or real interests of the other?"

Now it is very desirable, in regard to our opponents, not only that we should understand what is their position, and by what arguments they defend it, but also what are the peculiarities of character which lead them to it. I will first, therefore, consider, what are those precise views on religious matters, which lead these men to hate with so bitter a hatred the holy austerities of the Saints. I have not, indeed, had the advantage of reading so much as I could wish of their writings; and, of course, in the case of those who are avowedly eccentric, no general description can be given which will quite fully apply to all; but the notion which I have formed of them on the whole is such as this. They are men of singularly genial and hearty temperament; and it would certainly be most unfair to deny, that they have an

* See quotations from the *Edinburgh Review*, in Appendix A.

earnest zeal for Christianity, according to their own understanding of that most vague term. Again, their conception of Christianity itself, is far more faulty in what it omits than in what it contains. Daily reading of Scripture; certain short prayers night and morning; defending earnestly God's cause in the world; sympathising heartily and actively with the poor and afflicted (and that, too, with a deep sense of the equality which really exists among all men); labouring zealously in behalf of their fellow-men;—these things pretty well make up their whole notion of piety. As to those deeper exercises which, in a good Catholic, give their real value to such external performances;—the earnest desire for purity of intention, and emancipation from human respect; the incessant watch placed on the avenues of thought, lest unworthy motives should intrude; the constant communication through the day between the soul and its Creator;—such exercises as these they neither value, nor, in fact, comprehend: while the great doctrine of man's corruption, which alone can furnish us with even a tolerably correct appreciation of human affairs, is alien from their whole range of thought. It results from all this, that their picture of the Christian character differs fundamentally from the Catholic. Catholics regard Christian virtue as consisting in the will's abject prostration before Almighty God: but these Christians condemn such an attitude of mind as degrading and unmanly; and since they happen to be our fellow-countrymen, they further brand it as un-English.

I have said that these men not only do not value the exercises of Catholic piety, but do not even comprehend them. In fact they are not generally, I think, at all quick in understanding any view of things, which materially differs from their own. They are neither remark-

able for depth of philosophy, nor of feeling; indeed I do not think that a genial temperament is generally accompanied by feelings of any great keenness or depth. From both these defects it follows, that they are quite unable even to imagine the process, which leads men, differently constituted from themselves, either to Catholicism on one side, or infidelity on the other. They look down, I repeat, with great serenity both on Papist and infidel; yet it is the Papist who receives the largest share of their contempt: and those bodily austerities, which the Saints have so assiduously practised, afford special materials, whether for flippant ridicule or grave denunciation. How can it be otherwise? Consider the real nature of a Saint's aspirations; consider that burning desire of interior perfection, which would make it a far greater suffering to abstain from austerities than to practise them. Is it not plain, that many men of the class we are considering, can no more approach to the comprehension of such things as these, than a brute can approach to following the steps of a mathematical demonstration?

On the other hand, a vigorous state of bodily health is regarded by them as singularly suitable to the true Christian: (1) as a means of more effectually benefiting his fellow-men; (2) as more efficaciously securing influence over them; and (3) as 'preserving him,' to speak in their own language, 'from those sickly dreams and fancies, which lead to the horrors and superstitions of asceticism.' And, conformably with this view, I believe the pattern characters in their novels are generally tall, well-proportioned, powerful, muscular men; insomuch that if the days of barbarism were to return, and controversies were decided by blows, neither Papist nor infidel would have much chance.

Such, I repeat, is the notion which I have formed of these men; but whether or no it be substantially correct, is a question in no way affecting the scientific value of their principle. 'Human perfection,' they say or imply, 'consists in the coördinate perfection of body and soul; and no one can rightly do what the Catholic Saints do, viz. sacrifice one to benefit the other.' Now, in reply to such an argument, consider this remarkable fact, which has been urged in substance by Father Newman on many different occasions. Let us suppose for a moment, that there were no moral and spiritual nature at all; let us suppose, *e.g.*, that man simply consisted of body and intellect. Even so, we could not possibly regard human perfection as consisting in the coördinate perfection of those two elements. Who would ever dream, that a man, devoted to intellectual pursuits, does well in aiming at the robust health of a fox-hunter? No; the well-being of his body should be promoted so far, and so far only, as may make it the best *instrument* for intellectual work.*

But let this once be conceded, and all force is gone from that anti-Catholic principle, which I recently enunciated. Once admit that the body is rightly treated as a mere instrument to intellectual excellence, and what follows? Why, you give up altogether the principle, that man achieves his perfection in the coördinate perfection of each individual part of his nature. If body is rightly

* When mention is made of *hard students*, who are conspicuous for pale cheeks and sunken eyes; they are ordinarily praised and admired, on the ground of their intellectual zeal and devotion; because they burn the midnight lamp; &c. &c. We never hear of 'Manicheanism' or 'unnatural superstition,' except when the said pale cheeks and sunken eyes are caused by a more constant and earnest meditation on God, or by the means taken to secure strength against temptation. It is surely not uncharitable therefore to infer, that it is not the *means*, but the *end*, which is really regarded as unworthy of a reasonable being.

subordinated to intellect, there remains no kind of *à priori* presumption against the Catholic doctrine, that both body and intellect are rightly subordinated to perfection of the will.

VIII.

Having obtained this important argumentative advantage, I now come to the consideration of my more immediate opponents. The whole body of non-Catholics, I have said, who think with any vigour and ability, unite in regarding intellectual excellence as a most important part of man's perfection. Or if there be an exception to this statement, such exceptional cases, I believe, are undoubtedly those of men, who are really following the guidance of grace, and tending to Catholicism. Nay, in regard to the great body of anti-Catholic thinkers, I cannot think it even true to say, that they regard intellectual and moral perfection as *coördinate* and *equally* to be sought: they place intellectual perfection in far the higher rank of the two.* In order, therefore, that we may rightly understand the position which they assign to intellect, it is necessary that we first form a correct notion on their mode of regarding *moral* perfection. For true moral perfection indeed, as embodied in the Saints of God, they feel simple contempt, or contempt mixed with detestation. No Protestant, I suppose, ever lived, who less wished to pain or attack Catholics, than Sir Walter Scott: yet he has no more respectful appellation for St. Francis of Paula, than "an ignorant, crack-brained peasant;" and even in speaking of such a wretch as he describes Louis XI., he evidently regards it as the low-

* See, *e.g.*, the quotations from Sir W. Hamilton, at the end of Appendix A.

est point of his degradation, that he could have dealings with the Saint.*

But it is not heroic perfection alone; all moral perfection is odious and contemptible to these anti-Catholic thinkers. For those of us who have the lowest vocation, no less than for those who have the highest, one *kind* of means only is open, whereby we can become morally and spiritually better. Such means are those which I have already mentioned:—watching the avenues of thought; labouring for purity of intention; fixing our affections more and more on the invisible world; struggling to live in a constant sense of abject dependence upon God. But such spiritual discipline as this, such increasing indifference to worldly and temporal ends whether personal or national, is regarded by these unhappy men as simply degrading and contemptible. The “Saturday Reviewers,” *e. g.*, are never weary of pointing to what they call “Roman Catholic asceticism,” as the very ground and foundation of “Roman Catholic superstition.”

At the same time, there are certain qualities of the will, which our opponents *do* hold to be virtues, and which they regard accordingly with much respect and admiration: justice; active benevolence; courage; pa-

* The passage is worth quoting; it is from the introduction to *Quentin Durward*.

“In his extreme desire of life, he” [Louis XI.] “sent to Italy for supposed relics, and the yet more extraordinary importation of an ignorant “crack-brained peasant” [St. Francis of Paula], “who, from laziness probably, had shut himself up in a cave, and renounced flesh, fish, eggs, or the produce of the dairy. This man, who did not possess the slightest “tincture of letters, Louis revered as if he had been the Pope himself, “and to gain his good will founded two cloisters.”

The reader will see with amusement, how self-evidently absurd and degrading Sir W. Scott considers it, to reverence any one who has no “tincture of letters.” Yet surely Sir Walter is an unusually favourable specimen of anti-Catholic thinkers.

triotism; and the like. How much of real virtue there is in these qualities, when divorced from the exercises of interior piety,—is a question on which much difference of opinion is found among Catholics themselves. All, indeed, will agree, that there exists in them a *certain* virtuous element; and all, I suppose, will agree, that there is also a miserable admixture of worldly motives. For myself, I should call them rather the distortions and caricatures of virtue, than real virtues: but however this may be, they are undoubtedly regarded by our opponents as constituting man's *moral* perfection, and as such receive a considerable share of their homage. Here, however, I may be allowed for one moment to interrupt the course of my argument, for the purpose of making this remark. Just as I implied a few minutes ago, that those men have been most intellectual, who have had no idolatrous veneration of intellect, so much more in the case of these objective and external virtues: those have been immeasurably the most distinguished for works of justice, of true courage, of active benevolence, who have most absolutely built their love for man on the foundation of love for God. And the more candid of our opponents in some sense do us justice; they will really admire the disinterested self-devotion displayed by a sister of charity, even though it be found in connexion with that interior piety, which to them is so distasteful. But the more prejudiced shrink from this: the very contemplation of unworldliness is so odious to them, that they are unable to admire any qualities in one who conspicuously practises it; so that, by a startling opposition to Catholic doctrine, they really feel as though moral virtue lost its virtuousness by being referred to God.

I have spoken here of our opponents as really valuing

no virtues, except those which lead to the external service of our fellow-men. Yet I am far from denying that, by the more Christian of their number, qualities of a far higher and more evangelical stamp are regarded as virtues, and admired accordingly. I have both admitted this, and explained my meaning in the admission, when I was speaking of those who are called muscular Christians; though it is by no means these men alone, in whose favour the remark should be made. Still these more Christian anti-Catholics hardly yield to the most openly unchristian of the number, in their hatred and contempt of what they call the ascetical principle; that is, of genuine Catholic piety. Moreover, it is very plain, that what they conceive as moral virtue, can never wear a consistently heroic aspect. And from this cause, if it stood alone, the result would naturally follow, that these anti-Catholics feel much deeper reverence for intellectual than for moral excellence. The fact, at all events, seems to me certain. When speaking of those who are the choicest specimens of our common nature, who have most displayed its wonderful capabilities, who are to be the prominent objects of man's reverence and homage, it is to the great intellectual giants that they ordinarily turn. Lord Brougham, *e. g.*, speaks thus, to encourage his hearers in the study of physical science: "It is no mean reward of our labour to become acquainted with the prodigious genius of those, who have *almost exalted the nature of man above its destined sphere*; and who hold a station apart, *rising over all the great teachers of mankind*, and spoken of reverently, *as if Newton and Laplace were not the names of mortal men.*"*

* Quoted in Father Newman's Letters, signed "Catholicus" (London, 1841), p. 6.

Such is the foul and degrading idolatry, into which, by a kind of judgment, God may permit men to fall, who are never weary of sneering at what they call our idolatrous devotion to the Mother of God. And the contrast with Catholic doctrine is remarkable indeed. Let us suppose a mathematician and astronomer, possessing tenfold the combined intellectual power of Lord Brougham's two idols, Newton and Laplace. It is an elementary point of Catholic doctrine, that such power will not have the slightest tendency to save him from eternal torment; and that if he has not occupied himself before his death with matters far more connected with his true end, his infallible doom will be the worm which dieth not, and the fire which is not extinguished. "Laudantur ubi non sunt, torquentur ubi sunt."

IX.

So extremely opposite is the position which Catholics and anti-Catholics respectively assign to intellect. And now I proceed to argue, that reason pronounces quite clearly on the Catholic side. Anti-Catholics say that intellectual excellence is an integral part of human perfection. Now the only plausible argument I have ever heard for this thesis, is that of which we have already disposed. "Human perfection," they say or imply, "consists in the coördinate perfection of each various element contained in man's nature." Now I have already shown that they do not themselves hold this principle; for they do not venture on applying it to the relations between physical and intellectual well-being. It is not our business to answer their argument, for they have themselves withdrawn it before they come into court. Having no more to say, therefore, about *their*

argument, let us proceed with urging our own. Reason, I say, abundantly shows, that human perfection consists in perfection of the moral and spiritual nature, and in nothing else. I would not maintain this, indeed, in the case of those who are both atheists and necessitarians. Truly it may well be thought, that in their holding these two errors—the error of atheism and the error of necessity—unreason has already reached its lowest point. At all events I would not deny, that those who are both atheists and necessitarians may consistently enough regard intellectual cultivation as equally desirable with moral, or even more so. But if either of those two doctrines be admitted which are contradictory to the above-named errors, and still more if both be admitted, the Catholic conclusion is at once reached.

Thus, let it be assumed that there is a God; that we have been created by an Infinitely Holy Being, to Whom we owe absolutely and without exception every thing which we have, every thing which we hope, every thing which we are. The more we ponder on this truth, the more we shall regard it as a self-evident maxim, that we reach our perfection, in proportion as we are more prompt at every moment of our life to obey His Commands and follow His Preference. But, as I have already urged in a different connexion, such promptitude is simply the perfection of our moral and spiritual nature; it is obtained by constant discipline of the will, and cannot possibly be obtained in any other way. Hence man's perfection is the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature.

Secondly, let us assume, against the necessitarians, that our will is free; or, as the expression runs, that it is a self-originating principle of causation. Let us assume, in other words, that acts of the will are originated

by ourselves, in a sense quite different from that in which we can be truly said to originate any other acts whatever. It is plain that this fact confers on the will a dignity and importance, quite immeasurably greater than any other faculty can possess. It is plain that we shall achieve our highest perfection, in proportion as we shall have trained this so importantly endowed faculty, to put forth its self-originated operations in the right and true direction. But this we can only effect by moral discipline; or, as we Catholics have learned, by faithful coöperation with the solicitations of Divine Grace. Whether, therefore, our opponents admit the doctrine of Theism, or the doctrine of free will,—and still more of course if they admit both,—in any of these cases the Catholic conclusion follows, that man's perfection is perfection of the will.

X.

The ground which I have occupied has been very narrow, as I said at starting. Yet surely we gain considerable advantage, if we are able (1) to lay our finger on that precise point which is the deepest matter of difference between Catholic and anti-Catholic schools of thought; and (2) to show that *on* that point reason is most clearly with us and against our opponents. And now, before drawing one or two obvious inferences, it will perhaps conduce to clearness, if I briefly recapitulate by putting before you a skeleton of my argument. I began with two preliminary explanations. By the word 'anti-Catholic' I mean to express, not those who are still warmly attached to the old heresies of Luther and Calvin, but the vigorous and original non-Catholic thinkers of the present day. And the word 'intellect' I use, not in its theological and strict philosophical sense, but in its

ordinary acceptation: I mean by intellect that faculty, whereby we carry forward scientific processes of thought. After these two explanations, I laid down two propositions, as most certainly implied in the Church's doctrines and practice. First, man's perfection consists in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature: intellectual excellence having no part in it whatever. I showed this proposition to be the one Catholic doctrine, by reference (1) to the foundation of St. Ignatius's Exercises; (2) to St. Thomas and all theologians; (3) to the Catholic doctrine on meritorious acts; and (4) to the Church's canonisation of saints. Proposition second. The intellect, however, is capable of rendering most important service in promoting the spiritual welfare of mankind. And this I easily showed to be the Church's mind, by pointing out her constant appropriation of the highest intellectual gifts in her own service.

The former of these two propositions is that, which I wished to contrast with the anti-Catholic tenet. This latter tenet wears its most plausible shape, in the statement, that man's perfection consists in the coördinate perfection of the constituent elements of his nature. First in order I spoke of those, who lay stress on bodily well-being as an integral part of human perfection. And having given my own general notion of their opinions and tendencies, I examined their theoretical principle. I showed that they themselves in fact abandon it; that they themselves use the body as a mere instrument to the mind. From this special class of men, I turned to the anti-Catholic schools of thought in general; and to their universal doctrine, that intellectual excellence is a part of human perfection, and a part no less important than moral. I observed of these thinkers, (1) that *true* moral excellence is simply a matter of hatred and con-

tempt to them, whenever they come across its exhibition ; (2) that they feel, however, a real respect for those qualities which they *regard* as moral virtues ; but (3) that they have a far *deeper* veneration for intellectual excellence. Having thus placed in broad contrast the position assigned to intellect in the Catholic and anti-Catholic schools of thought respectively, I proceeded to argue, that reason is quite decisive on the Catholic side, as against all those opponents who are not at once atheists and necessitarians.

XI.

The first inference, which I shall draw from what has been said, concerns our controversy with these anti-Catholic thinkers. We must not over-estimate the advantage to be gained, by overthrowing those particular arguments, which are the explicit ground of their unbelief. It is no doubt most important for many reasons, that their arguments *should* be directly combated ; but even when Catholics have been most successful in the combat, the chief difficulty remains. The Church's practical recognition of spiritual perfection as man's true end, is a fact unmistakably written on her very front. How strongly does F. Newman state this fact. "I bear my own testimony," he says, "to what has been brought home to me so closely and vividly since I have been a Catholic ; viz. that that mighty world-wide Church, *like her Divine Author*, regards, consults, labours for, the individual soul. . . . She knows no evil but sin ; . . . she knows no good but grace ; . . . she has one and one only aim, to purify the heart."*

* *Anglican Difficulties*, pp. 197-8. It may be well to append another passage. "The Church . . . regards this world and *all that is in*

Now this great and most glorious characteristic of the Church, is to these men a far stronger ground of antipathy, than is any definite objection which they may entertain, against this or that doctrine. Here is the real barrier between them and us, and it is well that we should know it. It would in itself be an interesting task, to consider what will be the best means of leading them across the barrier. So much at all events we may confidently say, that in ordinary cases spiritual means will be more efficacious to that end than intellectual. The Church, I believe, has no enemies so deadly and so desperate as these. Yet to God's grace all things are possible; and our best hope of promoting the operations of grace will be, the striving to speak home to their conscience, and awaken in them the conviction of *sin*.

XII.

The second inference which I would draw, concerns not externs, but those of ourselves who are called to an intellectual career. There is no occupation which takes so firm and deep a hold on any man given to it, as the carrying on of intellectual processes; and that, because of the keen and constant pleasure which they afford. Now if intellectual excellence were a part of human perfection, these processes would be as simply conducive to our true end, as performing the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. But since both faith and reason teach a most

it as a mere shade, as dust and ashes, compared with the value of one single soul. She holds . . . that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin."—p. 199.

opposite lesson, it becomes a question of extreme moment, what is the bearing of these intellectual processes on our moral and spiritual nature. And no other audience can be so interested in the question, as that which I have now the honour of addressing: since we are all on the one hand Catholics; and on the other hand, by our very membership, profess ourselves more or less interested in intellectual pursuits. I will express therefore my own humble opinion, that few modes of life can be found presenting greater impediments to spiritual growth, than a life consisting of energetic intellectual activity, animated by keen intellectual ardour and delight. This of course is no reason, unless we are faithless and cowardly, for shrinking from work, to which God calls us; in which we may advance towards our own spiritual perfection; and in which we may greatly benefit the Church: but it *is* a reason, and the strongest possible reason, why those of us who *are* so called, should, in common charity to our own souls, be peculiarly watchful and diligent in guarding the heart and cultivating interior piety. I might give many reasons for this special dangerousness of intellectuality: the one on which I will insist, is its tendency to pride.

Pride may be regarded in one sense as the special antagonist to spirituality. Piety, as I said before, shows itself precisely in self-prostration; pride precisely in self-exaltation. Further, pride, if I may so express myself, is the least proud of all things; for it will condescend to regale on the very lowest and coarsest food. An unspiritual man will plume himself on any accomplishment he possesses, however insignificant:—on high birth, indeed, if he has it; on a well-filled purse, if he has it: but if he has not, then in other things; on having a good voice for singing, or being clever at

skating. But, of course, if we take no special precaution, pride will assume more alarming dimensions, in proportion as the objects which gratify it are more impressive to the imagination. Now, for various reasons, nothing else is so impressive to the imagination, as the possession of intellectual excellence. First, it is far more intimately part of ourselves, than are its most powerful rivals; such as wealth, or high birth, or the praise of men. Secondly, it makes its power felt through almost the whole of our waking life. Thirdly, that power, so far as we possess it, is one which gives us constant temporal superiority over our fellow-men. And, fourthly, in other ways it exercises an influence which may fairly be called tremendous. Supposing, then, that we do not exercise some special watchfulness against the terrible encroachments of pride; and supposing that God does not mercifully visit us with some counteracting influence, in the shape of sickness or sorrow; how unspeakably intoxicating is the possession of rare intellectual excellence! If pride in an unspiritual man will rise to astounding proportions, though its objects be comparatively trifling and insignificant, what will be its dimensions, when based on the possession of such a power as this? a power so intimately part of ourselves, so constantly felt, so raising us from the level of our fellow-men, so vast, and I might almost say ultra-human, in its influence! It is not too much to say, that intellectual pride is an enemy, which, unless we keep our eye fixed on his movements, and are ever repelling his insidious attacks, will ravage and lay waste our whole interior life.

And if there is such serious danger even to ourselves, surrounded as we are by the Church's holy influences, what madness of intellectual pride may we expect to find

in those without! In many such men it may truly be called devilish. It is so, in the literal comparison implied by that word; for whereas the evil spirits are so characteristically *proud*, what is, or can be, the object of their pride, except simply their intellectual endowments; their extent of knowledge, their deep acquaintance with human nature, their comprehensive view of human affairs, their craft, their versatility? And here, indeed, we may add another concluding argument in behalf of the Catholic doctrine, which will be cogent at least against those anti-Catholics who admit the existence of evil spirits. Is it probable that intellectual excellence can be an integral part of human perfection, when the devils themselves possess it, and possess it in a degree which far exceeds the human? This is what we should say to ourselves when tempted by intellectual pride. What a ground for self-complacency! the possession of a gift, which is shared by the devils; and shared by them in greater degree than by the ablest of us all!*

* It is remarkable how very strongly the "Imitation" speaks on the dangers of intellectual activity. The author's words show that he regards such dangers as none the less serious, even though that activity be exercised on theology.

"Quid prodest tibi alta de Trinitate disputare, si careas humilitate?

Opto magis sentire compunctionem quàm scire ejus definitionem. (lib. i. cap. 1.)

Scientia, sine timore Dei, quid importat?

Melior est humilis rusticus qui Deo servit, quàm superbus philosophus qui, se neglecto, cursum cœli considerat.

Quiesce à nimio sciendi desiderio; quia magna ibi invenitur distractio et deceptio.

Hæc est altissima et utilissima lectio, sui ipsius vera cognitio et despectio. (cap. 2.)

Adveniente die judicii, non quæretur à nobis quid legimus, sed quid fecimus.

Quàm multi pereunt per vanam scientiam in sæculo, qui parùm curant de

XIII.

You may remember that I mentioned a second proposition, as being to my mind no less clearly implied in Catholic doctrine and practice, than that which we have considered to-day: it is, that intellectual excellence can render most important service to the Church's end. If I should be called on (in the course of another year or so) to read again, I should propose to take that proposition for my theme. I would labour to illustrate these two points. First, there never was a time, when intellectual power of every different kind was more clamorously called for in the Church's behalf, than the present. And, secondly, it will be impossible for us to perform any of the *more* important services needed from such agency, unless we contend with zeal and unremitting constancy against the intrusion of intellectual pride. I would maintain, that in proportion as we yield ourselves up captives to that most dangerous enemy, the practical ends which we value will be so utterly antagonistic to the Church's ends, that our counsels must, of

Dei servitio. Et quia magis eligunt magni esse quàm humiles, ideò evanescent in cogitationibus suis. (cap. 3.)

Melius est sapere modicum cum humilitate et parvâ intelligentiâ, quàm magni scientiarum thesauri cum vanâ complacentiâ. (lib. iii. c. 7.)

Stude mortificationi vitiorum; quia hoc ampliùs tibi proderit, quàm notitia multarum difficilium quæstionum.

Væ eis, qui multa curiosa ab hominibus inquirunt, et de viâ mihi serviendi parùm curant.

Ego sum, qui humilem in puncto elevo mentem; ut plures æternæ veritatis capiat rationes, quàm si quis decem annis studuisset in scholis. (cap. 43.)

Natura appetit scire secreta et nova audire; sed Gratia non curat nova et curiosa percipere, *quia totum hoc de vetustate corruptionis est ortum* docet itaque in omni scientiâ Dei laudem et honorem quærere." (cap. 54.)

absolute necessity, be mistaken and mischievous in the highest degree. Such are the conclusions which, at some future time, I hope to advocate. For the present, however, I have concluded.

ESSAY THE SECOND.

ON THE DANGERS TO BE APPREHENDED FROM INTELLECT,
WHEN NOT SPIRITUALLY REGULATED AND CONTROLLED.

I.

SOME six weeks ago I had the honour of reading a paper, which proceeded throughout on a certain definite view of the relations between spiritual and intellectual excellence. This view has been partially misapprehended by some who were present; and by others, who rightly understood my meaning, it has been encountered with objections of greater or less gravity. Now the question is one of extreme importance in itself; and it is one specially interesting to us members of the Academy, who, by our very membership, profess a desire of promoting intellectual cultivation in a true and Catholic spirit. I shall therefore make no apology for returning to the same ground in my present paper, with the purpose of elucidating and vindicating the main principles contained in my former. I had intended, indeed, a different subject for this occasion; but its treatment must have entirely depended on the very theory which has been called in question. I hope therefore this afternoon, in the first instance, to place in clear and unmistakable light the meaning, and the certainty, of my original principle; and then to occupy what remains of our time,

in drawing out one or two corollaries, in addition to those deduced from it before.

II.

And first it has been thought, that I wished to discourage the vigorous cultivation of intellect. Far otherwise. I believe that intellectual exercises are capable of rendering very much more important services to the Church, than we are in general apt to consider. Those of us, therefore, who possess considerable intellectual power, have a sacred trust committed to our charge; and in my own humble judgment, it is of most vital importance to the Church's welfare, that we duly cultivate and exercise that power. This was indeed the very subject which I had proposed for my second paper; and had I been able to treat it, I should have shown how genuinely and earnestly I entertain this conviction. As it is possible, however, that I may not have the opportunity of recurring to it in the present paper, I must entreat you once for all to believe, how unforced and hearty is this expression of opinion.

III.

The second question which has arisen is a purely verbal one, though of considerable importance. It has been felt by some as a great cause of confusion, that I have used the term "intellect" in a sense altogether different, from that which it bears in theology and mental philosophy. Of course, those who criticise any statements which I have made, are bound to understand the words of that statement in the sense which I avowedly affix to them: but they have the fullest liberty to com-

plain of such a *modus loquendi*, as inexpedient and as tending to confusion. Such complaint has in fact been made; and yet I hardly know how to make the matter clearer than I did before. Although however the explanation, which I now supply, must be in substance identical with the explanation which I then gave, I will at least express it in a somewhat different shape.

To avoid confusion as much as possible, in explaining the theological sense of the word I will Latinise it, and call it '*intellectus*.' We are said then by theologians to exercise our *intellectus*, so far as we contemplate in any kind of way real or apparent truth. According to this sense of the word, *intellectus* is exercised in its highest perfection, in proportion as the truths which we contemplate are not apparent but real, not natural but supernatural. By consequence, if we use the word '*intellectus*' in its theological sense, perfection of the *intellectus* and perfection of the will necessarily proceed *pari passu*. On the one hand, in proportion as we grow in perfection of will, we grow in perfection of *intellectus*; for we apprehend supernatural truth more keenly and vividly. On the other hand, this keener and more vivid apprehension of supernatural truth reacts on the will, and renders its movements still more vigorous and efficacious. And this being the case,—viz. that *intellectus* and will proceed *pari passu* towards perfection,—a somewhat interesting scholastic question arises; but one of no practical moment in any shape, and at all events wholly irrelevant to our present theme. It is debated, whether *intellectus* or will be the higher power; for instance, whether it be the higher act to contemplate God, or to love Him. One thing, however, is worth briefly mentioning, on this scholastic controversy. It is characteristic of St. Thomas's school, as opposed to Scotus's,

that they follow Aristotle in regarding intellectus as a higher power than will; yet St. Thomas says, no less expressly than Scotus himself, that in the case of God and other superhuman objects, it is a less high act to contemplate than to love them.*

Such is the theological sense of this word intellectus. But it is a sense most widely divergent, from the ordinary and popular acceptation of the term intellect here in England, whether among Catholics or Protestants; insomuch that the most extensive and incurable misapprehensions must arise, if in ordinary cases we give it any such meaning. Two instances will be as decisive under this head, as two hundred. Nothing would be more natural than for any of us to say, that some school or college is satisfactory enough in its moral discipline, but greatly defective in its intellectual. What would be our amazement if we were understood to mean, that it trains its pupils satisfactorily towards *loving* God, but that it trains them very defectively towards *contemplating* Him! Yet such would be our precise meaning, if we had been using the word 'intellectual' in St. Thomas's sense. Or take for a second instance some contemplative nun, who even in her mental prayer has nearly ceased from reasoning processes, and is drawn by the Holy Ghost almost exclusively to contemplation. Suppose I were to remark, in a matter-of-course way—'How devoted she is to *intellectual* occupation! as compared with her, Newton and Laplace were babies in *intellectual* acquirement.' You would of course understand me to speak in jest or in irony. 'No,' I might

* "Quando res in quâ bonum est, est nobilior ipsâ animâ in quâ est
 "ratio intellecta, per comparisonem ad talem rem voluntas est altior intel-
 "lectu . . . Unde melior est amor Dei quàm cognitio." 1^a, q. 82, a. 3, 0.

reply, 'I am but using the word intellectual in its proper sense. It is a truism, not a paradox, to say, that this holy nun has her mind immeasurably better trained than Newton's or Laplace's, for the highest office of the intellectus, the contemplation of supernatural truth.'

It was quite impossible then to use the word 'intellect' in its theological sense, without being extravagantly misunderstood. And F. Newman plainly thought the same, when addressing an audience which in character very much resembled the present. I refer to his first course of lectures at Dublin on University education; in which he throughout uses the word intellect in the sense which I have adopted. I have only time to cite one passage, but it will be admitted as decisive. 'A truly great intellect—such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or of Goethe is one which possesses knowledge considered not merely as *acquirement* but as *philosophy*' (p. 214). A truly great intellect, you see, according to Father Newman, is not one which is eminently fitted for keenly contemplating the supernatural; but that which possesses knowledge considered as *philosophy*.

Whereas then it was perfectly out of the question to use the word intellect in its theological sense, it remained to ascertain its popular and ordinary acceptance. And I gave the following, as that to which the every-day sense of the word in England most closely approximates. 'I speak of a man using his *intellect*,' I said, 'so far as he is occupied with such processes as these: investigating evidence; analysing his various convictions and exploring their grounds; contemplating scientifically the phenomena, whether of his own mind or of the external world; carrying premisses forward to their conclusions; viewing a large field of truth in the mutual relation of its com-

ponent parts ; and the like.' And I may here further add, that, according to this sense of the term, intellectual *excellence* will signify that largeness, acuteness, penetration, grasp of mind, which is adapted to the successful performance of such processes as I have stated.

I think in fact that men, possessing high mental endowments, may be broadly divided into three classes : intellectual, poetical, and practical men. First, there are those whom we call intellectual ; who give themselves to philosophical and scientific pursuits, in the largest sense of that term. Under this head would rank theologians ; philosophers, whether metaphysical, psychological, or physical ; mathematicians ; and again historians. The second class contains men of poetical temperament, or those well fitted for advancement of the fine arts in whatever shape. These men would be described in common parlance as possessing genius, imagination, fancy, sensibility, rather than *intellectual* power. Lastly, there are the men of practical ability : such was the late Duke of Wellington ; such has been many a statesman who might be named. Of these men it would be ordinarily said, that they possess great insight into character ; great aptitude for influencing masses of men ; great readiness in seeing instinctively their road to a practical end ; but that their *intellect* is not of high or rare quality. The Church has had many of all these three classes among her most valued servants. She has received most important contributions from every one of the fine arts ; and she has had her practical men, St. Gregory VII. or St. Thomas of Canterbury. But surely, when we are told of those who have served her *intellectually*, our thoughts do not turn to such as these, but rather to St. Thomas Aquinas and the schoolmen ; or to Petavius and the other promoters of historical theology. True, indeed, that several of her most illus-

trious names are eminent under more than one head; but this very fact affords a further illustration of my argument. When we are told of the *intellectual* services rendered by St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, or St. Leo, our thoughts at once turn to the saint's theological or philosophical achievements, as *distinct* from those which were practical and administrative.

I cannot doubt therefore, that in my use of the word intellect I have conformed myself to the ordinary English acceptation. And you will have already observed, that I have F. Newman's authority distinctly with me. In giving instances of men intellectually eminent, he has named those only who have been given to scientific investigation; and he has stated it as the very distinguishing characteristic of a truly great intellect, that it possesses knowledge under the special form of philosophy.*

At last, however, this whole question is but of

* It would be impossible, within reasonable limits, to quote a tithe of the passages, in which Father Newman has implied the same sense of this word 'intellect' as that which I have given. Yet one or two may be serviceable.

In page 205 he uses the term '*intellectual* illumination' as synonymous with 'philosophy.'

In page 217 we have this striking passage. "That only is true enlargement of mind, which is *the power of viewing many things at once as one whole*, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of universal knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and *constitutes its perfection*. Possessed of this real *illumination*, the mind never views any part of the extended field of knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part; or without the associations which spring from that recollection," &c. &c.

Intellectual perfection, then, according to Father Newman's use of the term, is not perfection of the *poetical* faculty, or of the *practical*, but of the *philosophical*. On the other hand, that no amount of *knowledge*, merely as such, even tends to intellectual perfection, is most earnestly argued from page 214 to 216.

words: and I have only further to say, that throughout the present paper, as throughout the former, I shall un-deviatingly use the word 'intellect,' in the sense which I have thus distinctly avowed.

IV.

The two criticisms, which I have hitherto considered, are of a minor and subordinate character. But several, who fully understood my meaning, have criticised the thesis itself, which was the basis of my whole argument; and have wished that I should more fully illustrate and explain it. This I am the more ready to do, because its fuller explanation will but place in clearer light its undeniable, and I might even say its axiomatic, certainty. The thesis was this. It is implied, I said, in the whole body of Catholic doctrine and practice, that man's true perfection is the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature; intellectual excellence having no part in it whatever. In explanation of this thesis, I begin as follows: and if my earlier remarks seem at first to have little or no bearing on my subject, a very few minutes will show you, that on the contrary they imply the whole principle for which I contend.

The immense majority of mankind have no practical choice as to their way of life, except indeed within certain very narrow limits. Circumstances of external position, or of personal capability and fitness, are plain indications given them by God, as to the duties in which they are to serve Him. In very many cases it might appear, that if we were left to choose for ourselves, we might choose some vocation far more suitable to our spiritual advancement. Yet in this we should be mistaken: for from the very fact that God has marked out our path, we know that He has prepared for us the

special graces suitable to that path; and our only wisdom is, to labour faithfully in coöperating with those graces. What shall be our main duties, I say, is a question ordinarily determined for us by God; but it rests with *ourselves* how far we choose to make those duties so many instruments for spiritual discipline and growth. We act more perfectly, we are more personally perfect, in precise proportion as we thus comport ourselves; and here therefore let us briefly consider, in what kind of way this all-important work is to be accomplished.

The main characteristic of an aiming at perfection is, that a man aims, not merely at obeying God's actual Commands, but at consulting in every case God's Wishes and Preference. And our present question is, how will this aim develop itself, in making some duty to which he is called an instrument of perfection. I will mention four important particulars, as specimens of what I mean. First, he will consult God's Preference, as to the particular mode of performing it. Suppose, *e. g.*, he is called to the duty of personally educating his children. In determining the method of their education, he will not be content to follow his own fancy or caprice, or the mere example of those around him: he will take all the means in his power, by pondering on the circumstances of the case, and consulting with a spiritual director or other adviser, to discover which is the method more acceptable to his Creator. Secondly, the method having been determined according to which the duty shall be performed, from time to time he will apply his mind methodically to such questions as these. He will consider in the presence of God, what are the spiritual dangers specially attendant on this duty; what are the most hopeful means for obviating those dangers; how far he is diligent and careful in adopting these means; and

the like. Thirdly, he will labour specially at acquiring those two habits of mind, which may be called the two poles of an interior life, and which meet us accordingly at the very outset of that invaluable work, 'the Spiritual Combat;' I mean, diffidence in self, confidence in God. He will labour, I say, at uniting a practical sense of his own utter weakness in the warfare, with a loving and hearty trust in God's Power and Willingness to give him the victory. Now the fourth method which I will mention for making some given duty an instrument of perfection, differs from those already stated, in that it refers to every single instant of time which is occupied in the duty. He will be constantly contending, in God's strength, against the intrusion of those lower and unworthy motives, which will most assuredly effect an entrance, even without his suspecting their presence, unless he carefully guard the avenues of his heart. And here one caution is specially in place. God ordinarily attaches to each one of our duties a pleasure of its own, in order that we may practise it with more readiness and facility. But there is a constant tendency on our part, to turn this mercy of His against Himself, and make this pleasure our very end of action. Against this is directed a well-known phrase of the Thomistic theology: '*delectationes propter operationes, non contrà.*' It is our business to make use of these pleasures for the better performance of our duties: we counteract the order of nature and abuse God's gifts, when we perversely allow these pleasures to be our very motives of action. Yet nothing, except earnest prayer and unwearied vigilance, will enable us to make head against this most subtle and most dangerous tendency.

These four particulars will suffice for my purpose, as specimens of what I mean. I have not entered at all into

the question, in itself a most important one, how far we place our very salvation in jeopardy, unless in some degree at least we aim at perfection; for this question is irrelevant to my present purpose, which leads me only to consider what *is* perfection. Nor, of course, do I forget, how repeated and egregious will be our failures in the great combat; yet at last God knows our weakness far better than we know it ourselves, and the very wish and attempt at perfection is inexpressibly dear to Him. Finally I say, that even if we do *not* choose to attempt it, the fact is no less certain, that that course of action, from which we shrink, is nevertheless the more perfect course. And if we be not practically impressed with this fact, we simply bungle and make mistakes; just as when we are not practically impressed with any other truth which intimately concerns us.

Now that view of human perfection, which I have maintained to be implied by Catholic doctrine and practice, is comprised in the three following propositions. (1) Just as various men are called to other modes of life,—to be poets, or lawyers, or merchants, or clockmakers, or professional singers,—so some of us are called to the occupation of intellectual activity in one or other branch of knowledge: in theology, or philosophy, or history, or physical and mathematical science, as the case may be. (2) Just as all other men act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as they make their external work an instrument of interior perfection;—so those of us who have *this* vocation act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as we make our *intellectual* exercises an instrument of interior perfection. (3) One man is more perfect than another, in precise proportion as he is more spiritually perfect. No one ever thought of saying that A tends to be more perfect than B, because

he sings better, or makes better clocks; nor yet because he has more muscular power, or has worked more assiduously at its development: so neither does A tend to be more perfect than B, because he has greater *intellectual* power, or because he has worked more assiduously at its development. True indeed, A may sing, or make clocks, or practise gymnastics, from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention; in which case these exercises do so far increase his real perfection: and in like manner (neither more nor less) *intellectual* exercises, if practised from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, increase his true perfection. But this is not because he possesses musical, or muscular, or intellectual, power; nor yet precisely because he exercises that power; but exclusively, because he makes such exercise his instrument for advance in piety. This therefore at last is the hinge of the whole question; our making intellectual exercises an instrument for advance in piety.* Let me review then the four particulars just recounted, in their special reference to the occupation which we are now considering,—the occupation of intellectual labour.

The first particular mentioned was, that those who act more perfectly, will consult God's Preference as to the particular method of pursuing the occupation, instead of following their own fancy and caprice, or the example of others. So likewise, if we have considerable intellectual gifts, and wish to use them as means of perfection: in such case we shall pursue a very different course, from that of simply following our own taste and bias, as to the branches of knowledge which we shall cultivate, or

* Of course I admit without reserve, that intellectual power is capable of rendering immeasurably more important service to the spiritual welfare of mankind, than is musical or muscular power. See p. 33. But that is a totally different question.

the relative prominence we shall give to those respective branches. No: we shall take every means in our power to discover, which will be the particular course of study most acceptable to God. It would carry me quite too far, to discuss the various considerations which would lead us to a right decision on this head; nor of course do I dream of denying, that the very fact of our having some special taste and aptitude, is one very strong mark of our real vocation. But it is very obvious that if, instead of labouring to ascertain God's Preference, we indulge ourselves as a matter of course, without either question or restraint, in following our particular humour and inclination, we are wandering far from the road of perfection.

The second particular which I mentioned was, that if we wish to make our external work a means of perfection, we shall from time to time consider methodically, its especial spiritual dangers and their appropriate remedies. Now there are various spiritual dangers, peculiar to this occupation of intellectual activity; and I will mention some few as a sample. We shall ask ourselves then, on such occasions, how far we labour, not merely by fits and starts, but regularly and systematically, at our intellectual work; regarding our mental power as a sacred trust, for the use of which we shall have to give account. We shall ask ourselves, on the other hand, how far we allow such labour to interfere unduly with other obligations; with prayer and spiritual reading, or social duties, or the necessary care of health. We shall ask ourselves again, how far we really pursue truth in our investigations; or instead of this, seek for evidence to confirm some conclusion, on which we have already determined. Or again, if engaged in controversy, how far have we really striven to understand our adversary's point of view? how far may pride have re-

strained us from admitting, even to ourselves, our own exaggerations or mistakes? how far have we kept in view, on the one hand, the interests of peace and Christian charity; on the other hand, the obligation of contending uncompromisingly for essential principles? Such questions as these originate in the very nature of the case. But further, as Catholics, we recognise a Church divinely privileged to teach infallible truth. Here therefore another series of questions is suggested, if our intellectual investigations extend over that territory, which is under the Church's direct dominion. How far do we sincerely labour to discover the Church's real mind? how far do we make it our one end to find what she *does* teach, and not what, by some plausible device, we may imagine her to teach? or in other words, how far do we strive, not that the Church may be on *our* side, but that *we* may be on the Church's side? Or again, where she has not expressly pronounced, how far do we submit ourselves to her spirit and general tendency? In one word, how far do we comport ourselves towards her in that humble and reverential attitude, which alone is reasonable towards God's infallible representative on earth? Such questions as these, I say, we shall from time to time carefully consider in God's Presence; so far as we discover faults in our past conduct, we shall humble ourselves for those faults, and try to discover the most hopeful means for their correction; and then we shall from time to time further examine, how far we have been diligent and careful in practising these means.

The third particular which I mentioned, as helping us to make some external duty a means of interior perfection, was the labouring to unite diffidence in self with confidence in God. This diffidence in self will be singularly hard of attainment, if we have for some considerable time yielded

ourselves unreservedly to intellectual excitement. It will be very hard of attainment, I say, because of the fearful pride to which intellect gives occasion, in those of us who have not most carefully guarded the avenues of our heart.

The fourth particular was, to strive against the strong tendency which exists, to make the pleasure of our occupation our end of action. If those of us, who are devoted to intellectual pursuits, enjoy good health, easy circumstances, and freedom from worldly trouble, we are quite sure (unless we adopt special precautions) to throw ourselves on our study with a kind of voracity, which is the intellectual man's gluttony. Hardly a pleasure can be named, which so unites keenness with long continuance, as that of intellectual excitement. If we allow ourselves, then, to make this pleasure our one end of action, all the time given to these pursuits will be spent (to say the least) in one protracted imperfection; since every high and supernatural motive, during this whole period, will be banished from our hearts.

V.

I have now enabled myself to obtain three important results. First, I have sufficiently explained what I meant in my former paper, when I spoke of intellect and our other faculties being subordinated to our will; and also what I mean in my present thesis, when I speak of intellect being spiritually regulated and controlled. Secondly, I can make clear the precise force of my proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in the perfection of his moral and spiritual nature. I mean this: we are more perfect, not at all in proportion as we are more fitted for the performance of philosophical processes; but exclusively in proportion as we are more prompt and well disposed, towards subjecting both our intellect and all our other

faculties to spiritual regulation and control. Thirdly, I can show how unanimous are all good Catholics in favour of my proposition, when once it is understood: for all good Catholics will admit, that we are more perfect, in proportion as we are more assiduous in following such a course of life, as that which I have briefly sketched.

VI.

I said in my former paper, that I had only time for a brief selection from the various arguments, which make it so certain that my proposition is implied in the Church's whole doctrine and practice. I mentioned four arguments, however, any one of which, though it stood alone, would in my judgment be irrefragable. I argued (1) from St. Ignatius's Foundation; (2) from the consent of theologians; (3) from the doctrine of merit; (4) from the canonisation of Saints. I have nothing more now to add on either of these heads, except the second; consent of theologians. Some persons seem to have thought, that though my doctrine be sound, yet at least my mode of expression is novel. I assert confidently the exact reverse. Certain as I hold it to be that my doctrine is the one Catholic doctrine on perfection, it is even more obviously certain (because more on the surface of things) that my expression is the one Catholic expression on the subject. The words '*status perfectionis*,' '*perfectio nostra*,' '*virii perfecti*,' are recognised theological phrases, and are treated in every complete corpus. Theologians discuss, how far perfection is measured simply by the degree of charity; or partly by the practice of evangelical counsels; or partly again by our degree of moral virtue. But as to intellectual excellence having any part or parcel in the matter, they do not deny it, simply because the very

notion never occurs to them. I have room for very few citations; but they will be sufficient. 'Every thing is said to be perfect,' says St. Thomas, 'in proportion as it reaches its proper end. But it is charity which unites us to God, Who is the ultimate end of the human mind.' Billuart adopts St. Thomas's statement, word for word. Sylvius: 'A thing is then said to be perfect, when it gains its proper end: but by charity it is that man in this life reaches his end; for he is thus joined to God, Who is our last End.' Suarez: 'Our perfection consists in union with God; but charity it is, which unites us to God.'*

I only wish that this were a suitable opportunity, for entering at greater length into the whole theological question.

VII.

It would only weary you, if I attempted here to answer all the objections, which have been made against my statement; though I have not heard of one, to which I am not fully prepared with my reply. I will here, therefore, treat those objections alone, the discussion of which will elucidate still more clearly the meaning of my proposition.

* "Unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum, inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima rei perfectio. Caritas autem est quæ unit nos Deo, Qui est ultimus Finis humanæ mentis." 2^a 2^æ, q. 184, a. 1, 0. Billuart repeats these words, *De Statu Religioso*, diss. 1, a. 1, dico. 2^o.

"Unaquæque res tunc dicitur esse perfecta, quando proprium suum finem adipiscitur; eò quòd finis sit ultima rei perfectio: per caritatem autem homo in istâ vitâ consequitur finem suum; conjungitur enim Deo, Qui est noster Finis ultimus." Sylvius *in locum Divi Thomæ*.

"Uniuscujusque rei perfectio est unio ejus ad suum ultimum finem: noster autem finis ultimus est Deus, Qui nobis per fidem manifestatur; ergo perfectio nostra in unione ad Deum consistit: caritas autem est, quæ nos Deo unit." Suarez *de Statu Perfectionis*, cap. 3, n. 4.

See Appendix B for an answer to theological objections, and a somewhat fuller statement of the theological argument.

First, then, it has been objected, that my proposition is ambiguous, because I have not explained what I mean by perfection. I hoped I had made this sufficiently clear in my former paper; but I am most willing to speak more explicitly. In regard, then, to any creature, there cannot be a better definition of the word 'perfect,' than that given by St. Thomas, and those other theologians whom I have just cited. Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it more nearly reaches its proper end; or to put the same thing in other words, in proportion as it more completely accomplishes its proper work, its *ἔργον* as Aristotle would say. A locomotive engine is more perfect, in proportion as it more combines strength, speed, and safety: the art of medicine is more perfect, in proportion as it enables the student more successfully to cure disease. And my proposition is this. Our body is more perfect, in proportion as we more combine health, strength, speed, and the rest. Our poetical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess a keener power of appreciating poetical beauty. Our practical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess genius and fertility of resource, for devising and carrying out plans of practical action. Our intellect is more perfect, in proportion as we have a greater power (to use F. Newman's words) of grasping a large multitude of objects in their mutual and true relations. But we, as *persons*, as *men*, are more perfect,—have more nearly achieved our proper end, have more completely accomplished our proper work,—exclusively in proportion as we are more morally and spiritually perfect. This surely is a most definite and intelligible statement, whether you agree with it or no. And I maintain that no different statement can be made on the subject, consistently with Catholic doctrine.

Secondly, I have been asked whether I can deny that

intellectual excellence is in itself a good, and may be lawfully desired for its own sake. I do not deny this; but I will simply recite the answer which Suarez gives, to a similar objection urged against St. Ignatius's Foundation. Health and life, says Suarez, are real *goods*; and yet it appertains to greater perfection, that we should not love these goods except as instruments of virtue. And let this, he adds, be understood of all other goods, which *may* be used amiss.* I say, then, what Suarez says: It is no sin to desire intellectual excellence for its own sake; but it appertains to greater perfection, that we desire it only as an instrument of virtue.

Thirdly, it has been objected, that intellectual excellence may be made most useful for our advancement in spirituality. I most fully admit this fact, but cannot see how it constitutes an objection. Indeed, considering the very serious dangers with which I represent intellect to be fraught when regulated ill, it would be harsh indeed if I denied, that it can render important services to us when regulated well. I will mention two in particular,

* "In principio seu fundamento Exercitiorum ea indifferentia affectus
 "humani commendatur circa res creatas non prohibitas, ut 'non magis quæ-
 "ramus sanitatem quàm ægritudinem, nec vitam longam brevi præferamus.'
 "Statim verò occurrit objectio, quia salus et vita sunt ex his rebus, quas
 "homo tenetur ex præcepto custodire et quærere mediis honestis ac decen-
 "tibus: non est ergo laudabilis indifferentia, non magis quærendi sani-
 "tatem quàm ægritudinem, &c.

"Bonum vitæ et salutis est ex his quæ propter se appeti possunt; id
 "est, quatenus per se sunt convenientia naturæ, et necessaria ad quandam
 "ejus integritatem, propter quam honestè appetuntur sine respectu ad alium
 "finem: et ideò *sine culpa* potest affectus non esse omninò indifferens circa
 "hæc bona secundum se spectata. Nihilominus tamen *ad majorem perfec-*
 "*tionem spectat* (et hanc existimo fuisse mentem S. P. N. Ignatii) hæc ipsa
 "bona non amare nisi ut sunt instrumenta virtutis. Quod
 "dictum intelligatur *de omnibus bonis* quæ, licèt per se amabilia sint, homo
 "potest eis *benè et malè uti*. In virtutibus enim, quibus homo malè uti non
 "potest, illa indifferentia laudabilis non est."

Suarez *de Religione Societatis Jesu*, lib. 9. c. 5, dubium quartum.

as specimens of many more. First, by means of theological study we are able to obtain a surer and firmer grasp of supernatural truth ; and secondly, we may derive great help from our intellectual power, in examining our motives of action more accurately ; seeing our faults more clearly ; devising more judicious means of spiritual improvement.

Fourthly, I have been asked whether I represent an intellectual life as less hopeful than others for advance in piety. I have already in fact answered this question, by saying that ordinarily it is God Himself, Who marks out our course of duty ; and Who prepares for us (as I may say) suitable graces along the whole extent of that course. If, therefore, we shrink back from it in alarm at its spiritual perils, we put ourselves out of the way of those special graces, which our loving Creator has prepared for our sanctification : and our spiritual loss is of course incalculable. At the same time I do certainly think, that the intellectual vocation is one specially beset by temptations ; and those the more dangerous, because so subtle and so likely to be unsuspected. But here, as in other spiritual matters, to feel our danger is almost to be safe. Let us be the more earnest in imploring God, that we may have His light to see these temptations, and His strength to overcome them.

Lastly, the case has been put to me, of two men equally prompt to serve and obey God, but one of whom has far greater intellectual power than the other. Can I deny, it has been asked, that the former is the more perfect ?

I answer of course most confidently, that he is not the more perfect, unless he be more morally and spiritually perfect. But it is a question of some interest, whether he be *not* more morally and spiritually perfect ; and (though several Catholics differ from me) my own

opinion is for the affirmative, with certain explanations and limitations. But before expressing this opinion, let me do some justice to the opposite view. A comparison was instituted in this room, as you may remember, between St. Paul and a pious apple-woman: but would it not be fairer, to make the comparison between St. Paul and St. John? Is there any reason in the world to suppose, that St. John possessed considerable intellectual cultivation? that he had any great power, for instance, of rightly understanding some vast system of heathen philosophy; and laying his finger on the precise points at issue, between that philosophy and the Christian Revelation? Yet is there any one who would regard him as on that account less spiritually perfect than St. Paul? However, as this particular case is complicated by the great fact of St. John's *inspiration*, let us take some two Saints of post-apostolic times: B. Benedict Labbrè, for instance, the beggar, and St. Antoninus, who wrote on Moral Theology. Supposing these two Saints were equally prompt to follow God's Wishes and Preference in every particular, who will say that St. Antoninus was the more holy, because he was more powerful in reasoning from premisses? or because he was more ready in solving casuistical questions?

Nevertheless I do think that in ordinary cases, if we suppose equal promptitude of will to God's love and service, the more intellectual man is the holier: and I proceed to explain my meaning. You individually and I individually are more perfect, in proportion as we have greater promptitude to serve and obey God. But it does not follow that, if you and I possess this promptitude in an equal degree, I am equally perfect with you. You may be of a lively and active, I of a torpid and sluggish, temperament. We may be equally prompt to serve and

obey God ; but those *acts* of service and obedience to which you are prompt, will be more intense, more vigorous, more sustained, than mine. And now to apply this principle. We give to our imaginary apple-woman a thorough intellectual education. We expose her thereby to most serious dangers, from which she would be otherwise exempt ; but we undoubtedly gift her with a far more vigorous and active mind. An educated person leads ordinarily a far longer life than another in the same number of minutes, because his succession of ideas is so far more rapid. If, therefore, by constant coöperation with grace, our apple-woman remains no less prompt to serve and obey God than she was before her intellectual cultivation, she has become much more spiritually excellent ; because those acts of obedience to which she is prompt, are far more sustained and energetic.

You will ask, then, if this holds in ordinary cases, why not in extraordinary cases also ? why does it not apply respectively to the interior acts of B. Benedict Labbrè and St. Antoninus ? For this reason. Where the Holy Ghost gives those rare and most precious graces which lead to the higher paths of sanctity, He imparts all, and immeasurably more than all, that vigour and keenness of pious contemplation, which intellectual cultivation can possibly confer. Suppose that B. Benedict and St. Antoninus were equally prompt to obey God : the very notion is monstrous, that the holy mendicant's acts of contemplation and love were in any one respect less intense and rapid, than those of the holy theologian.

There is a second sense, though a less proper one, in which it may be said that intellectual excellence renders a pious man more personally laudable. Suppose that you and I have in fact attained a precisely equal degree of perfection, but that you are far the more intellectually

gifted. It may be said that you are more personally laudable than I: because you have achieved your work under circumstances of greater difficulty; because you have reduced into due subordination so unruly a faculty as intellectual power. Take these two virtues for instance: simplicity of faith, and docility to the Holy Ghost. Such virtues may be called far more personally laudable in you than in me; because you have had a far greater temptation than I have, to trust independently your own intellectual light, instead of submitting to the Church's decrees, and searching earnestly for the Holy Ghost's guidance.

VIII.

I will now then regard my proposition as sufficiently established; and I will proceed to express one or two important consequences, which result from its truth. If God has endowed us with a powerful intellect, the one use of it (we see) which He desires at our hands, is that we submit its operations absolutely and unreservedly to spiritual control and regulation: and I have explained in some detail, what I mean by that expression. Now I would beg you to consider, how prominent a place in our mental organisation is held by intellect, if it be at all powerful; and also what important influence over others is obtained by its agency. If then the place, intended for it by God, is one of abject submission and obedience to a higher part of our nature; and if on the other hand we allow it uncontrolled freedom of operation; we might be certain beforehand, that most serious evils would ensue, whether to ourselves or to others. In my former paper I specially adverted to one of these evils, the tremendous intellectual pride which will assuredly be generated. I will here beg you to consider another; and one which

leads to more important results than at first might be supposed.

IX.

You will remember, that in the earlier part of this paper I spoke emphatically on the very serious evil, of pursuing intellectual exercises, not for the sake of investigating truth, but for the sake of enjoying the pleasure afforded by those exercises themselves. And I maintained that this result must always ensue, whenever those of us who possess great intellectual power, neglect the assiduous practice of self-examination and other spiritual discipline. Now Sir W. Hamilton expressly declares, that such *is* the end pursued by himself, and (as he maintains) by all scientific men without exception. He is speaking, as he tells us, of "every votary of science." "It is not knowledge," says Sir W. Hamilton, "it is not truth, that the votary of science seeks; he seeks the exercise of *his faculties and feelings*: and as in *following after* one" truth "he exerts a *greater amount of pleasurable energy* than in taking formal possession of a thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many" which are certain, "and prefers the chances of the one" which is uncertain. "Science is a chase," he adds; "and in a chase the *pursuit* is always of greater value than the game:" and he quotes with thorough agreement the statement of various philosophers, that they would rather search for truth than possess it.* Well then, at length we understand you, gentlemen of the philosophical world, if Sir W. Hamilton may be accepted as your representative. You would claim honour at our hands, as the investigators and discoverers of truth; and yet it appears at

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, pp. 10-13. The passage is quoted in full, and considered at some length, in Appendix C.

last, that you are not desiring truth at all ; that you would not possess it if you could ; that what you seek, is not that truth which shall benefit mankind, but that intellectual excitement and titillation, which shall make *your own* lives pass with less weariness and monotony.

Can any thing be well imagined, more degrading to philosophy than this, or more contradictory to the true philosophic spirit ?* And now further, all this miserable degradation of philosophy arises simply from the fact, that philosophers in general have neglected interior piety, and have placed their end in creatures rather than in the Creator. I have fully sufficient ground for this statement, in the reason which Sir W. Hamilton himself gives for his own doctrine. His conclusion is substantially this : we may fancy ourselves to be seeking the possession of truth, but we are really aiming at the pleasurable excitement of its pursuit. And he expressly gives the following reason for his conclusion. " In life we always believe that we are seeking repose ; while in reality all that we ever seek is agitation." Most true, if we look for our enjoyment apart from God ; most false, if we will but seek that rest and peace, which arises from His love and service. " All that we really seek," says Sir W. Hamilton, " is *agitation*." How different is the language of Catholic theologians ! St. Alphonsus, quoting another great Saint, tells us how St. Francis of Sales specially pressed on the attention of

* Father Newman in several passages comments on this perversion of philosophy, and its antagonism to the true Catholic spirit. I may refer for instance to the 'aphorisms' of the anti-Catholic 'Truth Society' in *Loss and Gain*. Aphorism 4. 'Man's work and duty, as man, consists, *not in possessing but in seeking*' [truth]. 5. '*His happiness and true dignity consists in the pursuit.*' 6. '*The pursuit of Truth is an end, to be engaged in for its own sake.*' 7. '*As philosophy is the love, not the possession, of wisdom, so religion is the love, not the possession, of Truth.*' 8. '*As Catholicism begins with faith, so Protestantism ends with inquiry,*' &c. &c. (pp. 361, 2).

sinner, the *peace* which is enjoyed by those who cleave to God. 'Let care be taken,' adds St. Alphonsus, 'that the penitent may know of that interior peace, with which those are gifted who enjoy God's friendship.* But peace, I suppose, is very different from 'agitation.' Suarez teaches, that the beatitude of this life consists in the contemplation and love of God.† The contemplation and love of God is not 'agitation.' But no one has expressed the Catholic truth more beautifully than Father Newman; and that, in words written some time before his own conversion to Catholicism. "The happiness of the soul," he says, "consists in the exercise of the affections: not in sensual pleasures, not in *activity*, not in *excitement*, not in self-esteem, not in the consciousness of power, not in knowledge. . . . This is our real and true bliss; not to know, or to effect, or to pursue; but to love, to hope, to joy, to admire, to revere, to adore. Our real and true bliss lies in the possession of these objects, on which our hearts may rest and be satisfied."‡

See then here the connexion of cause and effect. Putting aside Catholic theologians, a vast majority of specu-

* Quoted in my first volume 'on Nature and Grace,' p. 362.

† "Dicendum ergo est, beatitudinem hujus vitæ consistere in actibus "intellectûs et voluntatis, quibus æterna felicitas vitæ futuræ maximè participatur. . . . Inquiri potest, quis sit actus intellectûs, . . . qui principaliter requiritur ad beatitudinem hujus vitæ? . . . Dicendum est, "hujusmodi actum esse actum fidei, . . . quò anima *Deum Ipsum secundum Divinitatem Ejus* contemplatur, et (quoad fieri potest in hac vitâ) *simpliciter quodam intuitu intuetur et considerat*. . . . Addendum verò est, principalius "consistere hanc beatitudinem in *amore*." *De Beatitudine*, disp. 7, sec. 2, nn. 3, 5, 9.

‡ *Parochial Sermons*, vol. v. p. 357. Compare S. Augustine's well-known sentence: "Infelix homo qui scit illa omnia, Te autem nescit; beatus autem "qui Te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat. Qui verò *et Te et illa* novit, *non propter illa beatus*, sed propter Te Solum beatus est, si cognoscens Te sicut Deum "glorificet, et gratias agat, et non evanescat in cogitationibus suis." Conf. lib. 5, c. 4.

lative men have been utterly indifferent to the pursuit of inward perfection. From this, two results immediately ensue. (1) Such men are totally ignorant, I may say they are without the faintest suspicion, of that earthly bliss which is attainable, from the contemplation and love of God. (2) Since they keep no kind of watch against the intrusion of unworthy motives, they give themselves up, without reserve or restraint, to the mere *pleasure* of their occupation; and while believing themselves to desire truth, really desire their own pleasure and amusement. Then follows the last consequence of all. An influential philosopher of the day, and one learned almost beyond parallel, inspecting the records of past philosophy, finds that such has been the fact. He himself, not being a Catholic, nor (as would appear) having the least notion what is meant by interior piety, is destitute of the only key which can unlock the mystery. Instead, therefore, of mourning over this transformation of philosophy into a selfish intellectual gluttony, he endorses that transformation with his own eminent name. He for whom the dignity is claimed, of being a seeker for speculative truth, tells us plainly that with our present mental constitution "the full and final possession of speculative truth" (I am using his own words) "*would be the last, worst, calamity that could befall man.*"

X.

This fact alone surely deserves our most careful attention; viz. that the absence of interior perfection involves so deplorable a degradation of philosophy. But still more important results are exhibited, if we apply what has been said to the particular case of Catholic thinkers. And first, as to those whose study is theological. There are certain great and fundamental verities, which have been

revealed by God, that they may be our guide and our solace in the struggle for perfection, and that their pure and heavenly beauty may serve as an antidote, to the world's seductive and most delusive charms. The theologian who loves truth, will make it his principal aim to set forth these great verities: to make ever clearer the ground on which they rest: and (still more importantly) to introduce us into a far wider knowledge of their full extent; a far clearer view of their mutual bearing; a far deeper penetration of their true significance. But in proportion as the theologian loves mental excitement rather than truth, a most serious danger arises, lest his tendency should be very different from this. He may love to fish in troubled waters; he may give his chief interest to those minor and subordinate questions, which (from the very fact of their being minor and subordinate) are open and undecided, and which give, therefore, the larger scope for discussion. Learned men tell us, and I suppose with truth, that this was the special opprobrium of the more degenerate scholastics; and with many minds it has brought the whole fabric of scholasticism into most undeserved disrepute. I am far from denying, that these subordinate questions have an interest of their own; and that they often do much to illustrate the weightier matters of doctrine. But for that very reason, they will be far more satisfactorily treated by one possessing the genuine theological spirit; by one who takes an interest in them, *because* of their important relation to great truths; and who is altogether above the temptation, of using them as the mere instruments of intellectual pleasure.

But there is a second and more serious danger, by which we are far more likely nowadays to be assailed, than by any undue refinement of scholastic subtlety. Externally to pure mathematics, there is no conclusion,

however solid, which is not open to ingenious cavil. A genuine theologian, however, who is earnestly in search for truth, will be able in a very large number of cases securely to recognise the object of his search: he will confidently decide, that such or such a doctrine is fully and sufficiently established. But the case will be very different, if we are seeking (not truth but) the pleasurable excitement of discussion. We shall have a vested interest, if I may so speak, in keeping questions open, in order that there may be more room for that discussion, which affords us our favourite amusement. Considering such a tendency in that extreme state which is ultimately imaginable, one hardly knows what doctrine will be held as absolutely certain; there is hardly a definition of the Church (I doubt if there is so much as one) which under our skilful hands may not be stripped of its true meaning.

But this tendency may be more deeply and thoroughly understood, if we regard it from a slightly different point of view. Sir W. Hamilton, as we have seen, compares intellectual exercise to the pleasure of the chase. Take the case then of a foxhunter, with the dogs in full cry. If you step forward and shoot the fox for him, he will regard you as his enemy; for what he desires, is not the fox's death, but the delight of hunting him. And in the same manner, if a so-called theologian is not desiring truth but the pleasure of its pursuit, he will regard you as his enemy, if you deprive him of that pleasure by presenting him with truth ready found. Now the Church is precisely in that situation. There is a large ground, over which human reason loves to expatiate, but which is strictly within *her* jurisdiction. If we are imbued with the true theological spirit, if we desire truth and not our own amusement, we shall aim at deriving from the Church the greatest possible amount of that truth which is so dear to us. We shall in

the first place study most carefully each one of her definitions, which bears on the subject we are investigating, in order that we may derive from each the full instruction with which it is laden. Then further, by carefully combining various definitions and viewing them in juxtaposition, a far greater amount of truth is discoverable; and this also we shall eagerly appropriate. But again, there still remains a vast body of truth, which has not yet been expressed in formal definitions at all, but which nevertheless is clearly testified in the Church's mind and spirit. This precious treasure we shall also be eager to unlock; and we shall spare no pains, in devising and adopting the most hopeful means for that purpose. But far different from this may be our course if, instead of desiring the *possession of truth*, we desire the *pleasure of investigation*. There is then most serious danger lest, instead of honestly seeking to ascertain what the Church does mean, we labour to find a minimum of what she need mean. There is great danger in fact, lest we practically regard her, not as an instructress at whose feet we are to sit, but as an obnoxious restraint, whose means of annoyance we are to reduce.

XI.

I have been urging, that if those of us who study Theology neglect cultivation of the interior life, there is most serious danger, lest we give an outrageous prominence to our own philosophical reasonings, and be grievously wanting in docility to the Church's voice. The reason for this on which I have insisted has been, that we shall have far greater interest in the pleasurable excitement of investigation, than in the discovery of truth. But another equally probable cause of the same result, will be that overweening intellectual pride, on which I dwelt in

my former paper ; and which will greatly indispose us to abandon any private impression of our own, in deference to the Church's authority. And to avoid some possible misapprehension, I will briefly sum up the scope of my argument. Let me suppose that we possess a powerful intellect ; and that we give ourselves up with zest and ardour to its appropriate pursuits, while we neglect all methodical or persistent labour in regulating our interior. It is perfectly certain, I maintain, that there will grow up within us a fearful amount of intellectual pride ; and also, that ordinarily we shall be far more influenced in our studies by a desire of intellectual excitement, than by a desire of possessing truth. Finally, there is most serious *danger*, lest these two evil dispositions tempt us from due loyalty to the Church's teaching.

XII.

But the evils of such disloyalty, are much more conspicuously displayed in other fields of thought, than in theology proper. The Church, we must never forget, is our infallible guide, not in faith only but in morals also ; and every single proposition, of which right or wrong is a predicate, is under her direct jurisdiction. Consider for instance a thousand such questions as these. How far is this or that feature of character laudable, whether it be of national or of individual character ? how far is such or such a course of conduct morally allowable, in a lawyer, or a merchant, or a voter for members of Parliament ? how far, if at all, is the sense of honour (as it is called) a virtuous motive of action ? in what sense, and to what extent, is patriotism to be admired ? These are but samples, I say, of a thousand others. Or consider again such as these. The great mass of men who make up what is called public opinion in this Protestant country, or for that matter (I

unconsciously leavened with its contradictory. This is true, more or less, of all who are not saintly; nor is there any more important work given us on earth, than the labouring assiduously to bring our practical convictions into harmony with our speculative judgments. Those of us, therefore, who have not thus laboured, will tend, as a matter of course, to proceed on axioms which are contradictory to the Christian, in the moral judgments which we imply throughout the large field of history and politics.

Now three propositions are abundantly plain. (1) It is only in proportion as any ordinary Catholic familiarly apprehends and realises the Christian standard of morality, that he can conform his interior conduct to the measure of that standard. (2) But he will never acquire such familiar apprehension of the true standard, by means of its abstract and theoretical statement: he will acquire it only so far as it is impressed on him in the concrete; in its application to the various circumstances of everyday life. (3) Let me suppose, therefore, that by our intellectual power we obtain an important influence over his convictions; and let me further suppose, that the moral judgments, which we express or imply on human events, are in fact measured by a standard opposite to the Christian. We shall have put ourselves, it is plain, into such a position, that we are not indeed blind leaders of the blind, but much worse; that we are blind leaders of those who, if left to themselves, are far more clear-sighted than we. I say, 'far more clear-sighted than we:' because they would measure human conduct by the standard of spiritual writers, far more faithfully at least than they do, if we did not lead them astray, by the brilliancy and ability with which we insinuate the anti-Christian view. God has given us this most important and responsible endowment, intellectual power; and we

shall have used that endowment directly against its Giver. We shall have trained our fellow-Catholics, by its influence, towards preferring this life to the next; earth to Heaven; the creature to the Creator.

But I have not yet reached the climax. I have spoken on the tremendous evil, of measuring the world's conduct by the world's standard: but what if we go farther, and measure the *Church's* conduct by the world's standard? Yet this is by no means an improbable contingency. The Church enacts many laws, which so far cross the world's path, that they may naturally provoke our criticism, however small may be our interest in theology proper. She comports herself in this or that way towards the civil power; or she educates her priests, or her gentry, or her poor, after this or that method; or she imposes this or that command, in regard to the reading of unsound books. Now I am very far indeed from meaning, that on these respective matters there is but one legitimate Catholic opinion: on the contrary, the best Catholics may reasonably differ, on the various questions of expediency suggested by their recital. Nor again am I at all denying, that a private Catholic may most laudably state to the ecclesiastical authorities his opinion on such questions of expediency, and the reasons on which it is founded: if such statement be made under suitable circumstances, and in the spirit of dutiful loyalty and submission. My point, and surely an obvious point, is this. In order that we may have an opinion worth one straw on the Church's *means*, we must be in full harmony with the Church's *ends*. Now the Church aims simply at the salvation of souls. In her view, as in God's view, one single holy aspiration has more value, than any imaginable degree of intellectual or temporal well-being: except, of course, so far as these themselves confer some

spiritual benefit.* But let me suppose that we measure human events on a most different scale: it is plain, that the more keen and sagacious we are in discerning the signs of the times, the more skilful in adapting means to ends,—so much the more mistaken and mischievous must be every counsel which we tender to the Church. Our powers of mind, let me assume, make it almost certain, that the methods which we suggest are admirably adapted to the ends which we have in view. Since, therefore, these ends are most different from the Church's ends, it follows almost as a matter of course, that the acceptance of our counsel would be injurious and disastrous to her dearest interests. There may be many Catholics, indeed, far inferior to ourselves in intellectual power, who yet may instinctively perceive this profound opposition of principle. Nor have we any right to complain of them, however unable they may be to answer our arguments, if they instinctively distrust any suggestion which we make, simply as *being* our suggestion; simply as coming from those, whom they feel to be thus absolutely out of harmony with the Church's spirit.

XIII.

A very plausible objection may be made, against the practical conclusion to which my remarks tend. My practical conclusion, it would seem, is this: that none but interior persons should treat intellectually on matters, which are under the Church's direct jurisdiction. But who, it may be asked, will dare to say or to think of himself, that he is an interior person? Or rather, if any one do think so, is not the very circumstance of his

* See the quotation from Father Newman in p. 25, note.

thinking it, a clear proof that the case is otherwise? I make two replies to this objection. First, I have not spoken of those who *are* interior, but of those who *aim* at being so; and I drew out, in some little detail, the kind of mental exercises, which are implied in the having such an aim. Now the question, whether or no such exercises make up an integral part of our ordinary life, is a simple question of fact; on which we can no more be mistaken, than on the question whether at this moment I am reading and you are hearing me read. But, secondly, I have nowhere said, that those who do not aim at being interior will *for certain* be neglectful of the Church's teaching: I have only maintained, that there is most imminent *danger* of their being thus neglectful, *if* they are men of great intellectual power. Many of us may be proof against this danger, even though we do *not* aim at interior piety, through such causes as these: an intellectual recognition of the Church's just claims; or the feeling of reverence for her teaching, which has been implanted in us from our childhood; or our habits of faith and love, in that degree in which we possess them; or the fact, again, that our intellect does not rise above the ordinary level. And here, once more, arises a simple question of fact, on which it is surely impossible that we can be deceived. Is it or is it not the case with us, while we express or imply any moral estimate of human conduct, that our unfeigned aim in the whole matter is (1) the ascertaining in every possible way the Church's moral standard; and (2) the applying that standard to every particular case which comes before us? If we cannot answer this question satisfactorily, we are in fact taking our side (little though we may intend it), not as the Church's servants, but as her enemies.

XIV.

And at this point, the space which I have occupied warns me to conclude; not without many apologies for having so long detained you. In this and my former paper, I have treated but a small part of a very large subject: yet I hope I may have done some service, if I have only been successful in drawing the attention of thoughtful Catholics to that subject as a whole. It is at all times a very interesting inquiry, and in these days of intellectual activity it has become one of very pressing importance, to investigate the relation which exists between intellectual and spiritual excellence. I hope that these papers may be accepted as humble contributions to this great inquiry.

APPENDIX A.

SOME FEW PASSAGES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE PROTESTANT VIEW.

(See pp. 12, 13, 17.)

It has been alleged against me, that no anti-Catholics ever included bodily well-being in their idea of human perfection. But without seeking for individual citations, we may infer with certainty from a passage in Father Newman's *Loss and Gain*, that the view stated in the text is beyond question a recognised anti-Catholic view. There can be but very few of my readers, for whose information it will be necessary to state, that Carlton is a most favourable specimen of Protestantism; and that Reding is the chief character of the story, who is by this time far advanced on his road to Catholicism.

“ ‘Well,’ said Carlton, after thinking a while, ‘I have been accustomed to consider Christianity as the perfection of man as a whole, body, soul, and spirit. Don’t misunderstand me. *Pantheists say body and intellect*, leaving out the moral principle; but I say, spirit as well as mind. Spirit, or the principle of religious faith or obedience, should be the master principle, the hegemonicon. To this both intellect and body are subservient; but as this supremacy does not imply the ill-usage, the *bondage* of the intellect, neither does it of the body. *Both should be well treated.*’ ‘Well, I think on the contrary it does imply in one sense the bondage of intellect and body too. What is faith but the submission of the intellect? And as ‘every high thought is to be brought into captivity,’ so are we expressly told to bring the body into subjection. They are both well treated, when they are treated *so as to be fit instruments of the sovereign principle.*’ ‘That is *what I call unnatural,*’ said Carlton. ‘And it is what I mean by supernatural,’ answered Reding” (pp. 177, 8, first ed.).

In the next chapter, the author, referring to the conversation of which this is a part, says: “here he [Reding] was a young man of twenty-two, professing *what were really the Catholic doctrines* and usages of penance, purgatory, counsels of perfection, *mortification of self*, and clerical celibacy” (p. 181). It will be further observed, that

even so pious a Protestant as Carlton, who goes the length of admitting that 'intellect and body are subservient to spirit,' yet rejects as 'unnatural' the doctrine, that they should be simply so treated as to be made its 'fit instruments.' Lastly, Carlton gives it, as the recognised Pantheistic tenet, that man's perfection consists in perfection of body and intellect, leaving out the moral principle altogether.

My own language, throughout the first Essay, is in singular accordance (as will be seen) with the expressions of Father Newman. It may be well therefore to state, that I had no explicit memory of them when I wrote, but have since been reminded of them by a friend. At the same time, as I have before now said in print, take any one of Father Newman's utterances on the one hand, and any one of my convictions on the other hand, it is often impossible for me even to guess, how far the former may have been simply the one exciting cause of the latter.

I will next append some passages, written by a violent anti-Catholic named Heine, which a friend has translated from the German, and shown me as illustrative of my argument. I deeply feel the disgust with which they must inspire every Catholic; but it is very important that we should understand the real drift of that view, which I so earnestly oppose. The first series is from a work published in 1834, called 'Contributions to the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany.'

"I speak of Roman Catholicism, in whose leading dogmas is contained a condemnation of all flesh; and which grants the spirit not "only a supremacy over the flesh, but *would mortify the flesh in order "to magnify the spirit. . . .*

"But let us by no means deny the good which the Christian Catholic view did to Europe. It was necessary as a healthy reaction "against the awful colossal materialism, which had developed itself "in the Roman empire, and threatened to destroy all spiritual nobleness. . . . We recognise the wholesomeness of ascetic spiritualism, "when we read Petronius or Apuleius; works which may be considered "the 'pièces justificatives' of Christianity. The flesh had become so "saucy in that Roman world, that it required the Christian discipline "to chastise it."

At the Reformation epoch, "perhaps the painters of Italy carried on "more effective *polemics against priesthood* than the Saxon theologians. "The blooming flesh on the canvas of Titian" [he immediately speaks of Titian's 'Venus'] "are far more solid theses" than Luther's.

"Artists plunged enthusiastically in a sea of Greek mirth, *from the "foam of which the goddess of beauty once more emerged.*

"The immediate object of all our institutions (!) is therefore the

"*rehabilitation of matter ; its restoration to its dignity ; its moral recognition ; its religious consecration ; its reconciliation with the spirit.*"

The succeeding extracts are from a work by the same writer, on 'the Romantic School,' published in 1835.

In the medieval religion, "the world of soul is represented by Christ; the world of matter by Satan. Our soul belongs to Christ, our body to Satan. . . . The important thing is to renounce all the sensual joys of life ; to *chastise our body*, which is Satan's fief, in order that our soul may soar all the more grandly into the bright heavens, the radiant Kingdom of Christ. This view, which is the proper view of Christianity, spread itself with inconceivable rapidity, like an infectious disease, over the whole Roman empire. . . .

"Some day, when mankind shall have fully recovered, when peace shall have been restored between soul and body, and they mingle in original harmony, the artificial strife which Christianity has sowed between them, will be almost incomprehensible. Happier and fairer generations will smile plaintively at their poor forefathers, who . . . by mortifying their warm and coloured sensuality, almost faded away into cold spectres. . . . I use the words spiritualism and sensualism, to signify those two modes of thought, one of which wishes to magnify the spirit by destroying matter, the other wishes to vindicate the natural rights of matter against the usurpation of the spirit."

I am sure that a writer, with so many good points as Mr. Kingsley, cannot read such sentiments as these without some disgust ; yet he has himself used language, of which I cannot imagine any consistent interpretation that shall be substantially different. Thus in his introduction to the *Saint's Tragedy*, he refers to the '*Manichæan* asceticism' of the medieval Saints ; and in p. 19 he uses the same word '*Manichæan*' in a similar connexion. This seems to me an epithet literally without meaning, unless the author's implication be this : 'no one who believes that God created the body, can consistently hold, that body should be treated as the mere instrument of spirit.'

This word '*Manichæan*,' however, is not peculiar to Mr. Kingsley ; it is a permanent part of the anti-Catholic stock-in-trade. And all who use it, if they mean any thing, must mean what I have just stated. A similar view is put forth by Dean Milman in his *History of Christianity*. He is explaining (vol. iii. p. 291) the origin of that monastic spirit, which he so deeply disapproves. It originated in part, according to him, from "the importance assumed by the soul, now through Christianity become profoundly conscious of its immortality." "The deep and serious solicitude for the fate of that everlasting part

"of our being, *the concentration of all its energies on its own individual welfare*, withdrew it entirely within itself." This, one would have thought, is an amply sufficient foundation for the monastic spirit. But he regards this exclusive pursuit of spiritual perfection as so manifestly unreasonable, that some further explanation of monachism is required. He disparages (p. 323) "*the selfish ambition of personal perfection*;" and in the present passage calls its pursuit "*a sublime selfishness*." He is led therefore to give a further explanation for the phenomena of monasticism; and refers them in part to "*the universal predominance of that great principle, the inherent evil of matter*." He therefore, like Mr. Kingsley, seems to think, that if the body were once admitted to be good and created by God, there would be a manifest opposition to reason, in using it as the mere instrument of the soul's welfare.*

I have said in the text, that, among English thinkers, it is Mr. Kingsley and his school who have urged most prominently the claims of bodily well-being. The following passage from the *Edinburgh Review*, will be illustrative of this statement.

"It [*Tom Brown's School-days*] represents . . . a school of feeling rather than of thought, which, though small, is becoming very influential in the hands of zealous and eloquent teachers. It is a school of which Mr. Kingsley is the ablest teacher; and its doctrine has been described fairly and cleverly as '*muscular Christianity*.' The principal characteristics of" Mr. Kingsley "are his deep sense of the sacredness of all the ordinary relations and all the common duties of life; and the vigour with which he contends for the merits of simple unconscious goodness; and *for the great importance and value of animal spirits, physical health, and a hearty enjoyment of all the pursuits and accomplishments which are connected with them*. We entirely agree

* The passage runs as follows: "Monachism was the natural result of the incorporation of Christianity with the prevalent opinions of mankind, and in part of the state of profound excitement into which it had thrown the human mind. We have traced the universal predominance of the great principle, *the inherent evil of matter*. This primary tenet, as well of Eastern religions as of the Platonism of the West, coincided with the somewhat ambiguous use of the term world in the sacred writings. Both were alike the irreclaimable domain of the Adversary of good. The importance assumed by the soul, now through Christianity become profoundly conscious of its immortality, *tended to the same end*. The deep and serious solicitude for the fate of that everlasting part of our being, the concentration of all its energies on its own individual welfare, withdrew it entirely within itself. A kind of sublime selfishness excluded all subordinate considerations."

“with the first *and last* of these opinions ; nor do we think that many persons would dissent from them, when stated categorically. *They are closely connected with the whole Protestant conception of life.*

* * * * *

“The praise which Mr. Kingsley lavishes on athletic accomplishments is, we think, rather overdone.” . . . The work criticised “is open to the objection, that, not content with asserting the value of bodily strength, it throws by implication a certain slur on *intellectual strength*, which, when all is said and done, is much more important. No doubt strong muscles and hardy nerves are of incalculable importance ; but they *derive that importance from the mind of which they are the servants.*” Jan. 1859, pp. 190-193.

It is evident, from the penultimate sentence, that the word ‘mind,’ at the end of this quotation, signifies ‘intellect’ in its ordinary English acceptation. The Reviewer himself, therefore, implies that intellect should be (to use Father Newman’s expression) the ‘hegemonicon’ in our nature. The notion of a higher principle, to which intellect, body, and other faculties shall be subservient, is contradictory to the whole drift of the passage.

I am bound to add the Reviewer’s qualification of his statements concerning Mr. Kingsley. He considers that that gentleman holds really the same opinion with himself, “and probably means his books to imply it ;” but he does not think “they would convey that impression to an ordinary reader.” He also adds in a note, that Mr. Kingsley’s ‘Village Sermons’ appear to him “written in a somewhat different spirit” from the novels.

I have said in the text (p. 17), that the great body of anti-Catholic thinkers, while stating or implying the doctrine that our perfection consists in the perfection of each part of our nature, lay far greater stress on intellectual than on moral perfection. We have just seen an instance of this in the *Edinburgh Review* ; and Sir W. Hamilton also, whose Lectures on Metaphysics happen for another reason to be in my hand (see Appendix C), affords an excellent illustration of my statement.

“It is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection,” says Sir William (p. 5), that man “as a creature can manifest the glory of his Creator.” This, rightly understood and qualified, is a most true and Catholic proposition. But what does the author mean by “the accomplishment of his perfection” ? does he mean, what Catholics understand by the term, the acquiring an eagerness to know God’s Will in every particular, and a promptitude to perform it ? the acquiring an earnest and keen

disposition towards God's love and service? the perfecting, in one word, of his moral and spiritual nature? Far indeed from it. Man's "full perfection," according to Sir W. Hamilton, "consists" in the "*full and harmonious development of his individual faculties*" (p. 6). And he still further elucidates his meaning, in a passage which occurs a few pages later. "Mental Philosophy," he says (p. 14), is "a mean principally, and almost exclusively, conducive to the *highest* education "of our *noblest* powers;" "by no other intellectual application," he presently adds, are the mind's "*best* capacities so variously and intensely evolved." He regards those, therefore, as our "noblest" powers, which receive their highest education from philosophical study; he regards those as the mind's "best" capacities, which by that study are variously and intensely evolved.

I cannot imagine any one seriously doubting, that such is the doctrine held (explicitly or implicitly) by the great majority of anti-Catholic thinkers. I have not thought it worth while, therefore, to take any pains in seeking express testimony, until I find that any opponent exists, for whose conviction such testimony can be required. In my Preface I have stated, as distinctly as I can, the precise allegation which I make against these thinkers.

APPENDIX B.

ANSWER TO THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS, AND SOMEWHAT FULLER REMARKS ON THE CONSENT OF THEOLOGIANs.

I WOULD beg the reader, before entering on this Appendix, to read what I have said in p. 49, on the meaning of our word 'perfection;' and it would be better, indeed, if he would look through the whole treatment of objections, as far as p. 54. I will also make the preliminary remark, that as this Appendix is to be theological, I will forbear as much as possible from using the word 'intellect,' as I have used it in the two Essays, in its ordinary and popular acceptation: I will rather adopt its Latinised form, 'intellectus,' and use that term in its theological and strict philosophical sense. See pp. 4, 5, and 33-39.

The passages quoted in p. 48, occur without exception where the respective authors are expressly treating on 'perfection;' nor can any

thing be possibly clearer, than the conclusion which they indicate. Take St. Thomas. "Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it reaches its proper *end* : but it is *charity* which unites us to (God, Who is) our last *End*;" therefore, of course, we are more perfect, in exact proportion as we have more charity. The other theologians quoted use the same argument; and when Suarez says that theologians in general agree with St. Thomas's doctrine, I suppose we may take for granted, that they also agree with the reason which he gives for that doctrine.* The later part of this Appendix will abundantly show, that objectors have been active in deriving from every part of Theology, what they regard as difficulties in the way of my proposition: yet no one theologian has even been alleged as opposed to me, in any passage where he is formally treating of perfection, and has that question expressly and prominently in his thoughts.

The following will be a second proof, how completely that which I have stated is the one recognised doctrine. No one will doubt, that 'the perfection of the Christian life' signifies simply moral and spiritual perfection. But theologians, in their whole treatment of perfection, invariably assume, quite as a matter of course, that the 'perfection of the Christian life' is simply synonymous with 'our' or 'man's' perfection. I will give a few specimens of this from St. Thomas; but no theologian will question my statement. Thus take the very passage just now cited. The one legitimate conclusion from St. Thomas's argument is, '*our* perfection is greater in proportion to our charity:' but he has himself expressed that conclusion somewhat differently; "*et ideò secundum caritatem specialiter attenditur perfectio Christianæ vitæ.*"† He assumes as a matter of course, that '*our* perfection' is synonymous with 'perfection of the Christian life.' Again, the first article of this 184th question refers to "*perfectio vitæ Christianæ.*" But in his short preface to the whole question, he expresses the same idea differently. He refers to "*the perfection of this life*;" "*the perfection of religious*;" "*the perfection of bishops*;" "*him who is perfect*;" "*those who are perfect.*"‡ Indeed, this phrase '*virī perfecti*' is not at all un-

* "Theologi communiter, cum Divo Thomā, perfectionem vitæ Christianæ in solius caritatis perfectione constituunt." Suarez *de Perfectione*, lib. 1, c. 3, n. 3.

+ Why does St. Thomas add the word "specialiter"? Suarez no doubt is correct in saying, that it has the same meaning, which "essentialiter" has in article 3: "*essentialiter consistit perfectio Christianæ vitæ in caritate, instrumentaliter in consiliis, quæ ordinantur ad caritatem.*"

‡ "Circa statum perfectorum;" "De his quæ pertinent ad perfectionem episcoporum [et] religiosorum;" "Utrum perfectio hujus vitæ consistat in consiliis vel

common in Theology; and (I believe) quite invariably signifies those, who have arrived at a certain state of *moral and spiritual* perfection. I take, almost at random, a passage which I found by referring to the index of Benedict XIV.'s works: "martyres procudubio *inter perfectos sunt adnumerandi*" (*de Canonizatione*, lib. 2, c. 31, n. 9). No one will attribute to the general body of martyrs the faintest or smallest degree of philosophical or scientific perfection; they are 'perfect' as being morally and spiritually perfect.

When I said in the Second Essay (p. 47), that St. Thomas does not seem even to imagine the notion of any intellectual quality being included in man's perfection, I was using the word 'intellectual,' of course, in the sense which I avowedly affixed to it, throughout the two Essays. I meant that the notion never occurs to him, of including in man's perfection any philosophical or scientific power, whether natural or acquired. Indeed, if we look at his system as a whole, we shall be a great deal struck with the very inferior position which he assigns to such power: a circumstance deriving immeasurably greater importance from the well-known fact, that he is so unhesitating a follower of Aristotle, on all questions which he regards as purely philosophical. There is a certain enlargement and illumination of mind, which Father Newman most justly regards as constituting the perfection of 'intellect,' if that word be used in its ordinary and popular acceptation. See, *e. g.*, note to p. 38. This illumination of mind seems to be very much the same thing, with what St. Thomas counts as the *virtus intellectualis* called wisdom:* let us consider, therefore, how high a place he allots to this, among the various *habitus intellectuales*. He divides mental habits, whether of *intellectus* or of *will*, into four classes. First in excellence come the theological virtues: next he places the '*dona Spiritus Sancti*;' which are habits disposing the soul to be readily influenced by the Holy Ghost:† lastly, the *virtutes intellectuales* et

in præceptis;" "Utrùm aliquis *possit esse perfectus* in hac vitâ;" "Utrùm quicunque *est perfectus* sit in statu perfectionis."

* "Sapientia . . . convenienter judicat et ordinat de omnibus; quia judicium perfectum et universale non potest haberi, nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas." 1^a 2^æ, q. 57, a. 2, 0. "Sapientia habet judicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus, et *ejus est ordinare omnes, et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectis omnium.*" q. 66, a. 5, 0.

+ "Oportet . . . homini inesse altiores perfectiones, secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc, quòd divinitus moveatur: et istæ perfectiones vocantur dona, . . . quia secundum ea homo disponitur, ut efficiatur promptè mobilis ab inspiratione divinâ." 1^a 2^æ, q. 68, a. 1, 0.

morales.* First in dignity, then, among *habitus intellectuales*, is that which, alone of the theological virtues, resides in the *intellectus*; I mean, of course, faith. Next in dignity, among these *habitus intellectuales*, come those four *dona intellectualia*, which dispose man to being easily moved by the Holy Ghost. All these five qualities, as is evident, are most intimately concerned with moral and spiritual perfection; they grow with its growth and strengthen with its strength: and these, in St. Thomas's system, take precedence of that *virtus intellectualis* which he calls wisdom. Nay, he denies that this latter can be called 'simpliciter' a virtue at all; but only 'secundum quid.'†

And here I shall make my point clearer, if I notice an objection, which has been urged against my proposition. One of the *dona*, as well as one of the *virtutes intellectuales*, is called wisdom; and it has been urged, that this *donum* is no other than that philosophical enlargement of mind, on which Father Newman insists. But nothing can be more express than St. Thomas's words, in opposition to any such idea. There is undoubtedly a certain correctness of judgment on divine matters, which arises from a perfect use of reason; but this, in St. Thomas's view, appertains exclusively to wisdom the *virtus intellectualis*. The correct judgment on them, inspired by wisdom the *donum*, is entirely that which arises from our personal charity and heavenly-mindedness.‡ Look again at Father Lallemant's beautiful description of this *donum*. "The gift of wisdom," he says, "is such

* "Virtutes theologicæ præferuntur donis Spiritûs Sancti: . . . sed si comparemus dona ad alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona præferuntur virtutibus." 1^a 2^m, q. 68, a. 8, 0.

† "Subjectum habitûs qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas, vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota à voluntate: . . . et hoc modo intellectus speculativus est subjectum fidei; . . . intellectus verò practicus prudentiæ." "Primi verò habitus [sc. intellectuales] non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia . . . non simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem; non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur . . . bonus grammaticus aut bonus faber." 1^a 2^m, q. 56, a. 3, 0.

‡ "Sapientia importat quandam rectitudinem iudicii circa res divinas. Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus jam est iudicandum: sicut de his quæ ad castitatem pertinent, per rationis inquisitionem iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem; sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsam, rectè de eis iudicat, qui habet habitum castitatis. Sic ergo circa res divinas: ex rationis inquisitione rectum iudicium habere, pertinet ad sapientiam quæ est virtus intellectualis; sed rectum iudicium habere de eis secundum quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsas, pertinet ad sapientiam secundum quod

knowledge of God, His attributes, and mysteries, as is *full of flavour*.”* Surely no one will allege, that this gift is in any respect the same quality with that philosophical enlargement of mind, which Father Newman most truly deems the end of liberal education *as such*; and of which he again and again declares, that it is wholly distinct from moral and spiritual excellence.

I have been the more desirous of enlarging somewhat on St. Thomas's doctrine, because some Catholics have a vague notion, that he attaches special value to ‘intellectual exercises,’ in our ordinary sense of that term; *i. e.* to exercises of a philosophical and scientific character. I am confident, that nothing can be further from the truth than this supposition; and that no one, who has studied his system as a whole, will seriously maintain it. And now, in returning to his doctrine on perfection, I make one further remark. I have already said, that the notion never occurs to him, of any philosophical or scientific power having any kind of part in man's perfection. Still no one can doubt that, according to his doctrine, various *habitus intellectuales* are most intimately bound up with it; that they ordinarily increase, in proportion as that charity increases, which is the essential constituent of perfection. This undoubtedly holds (1) of faith; (2) of the various *donum intellectualia*; and (3) of prudence. Yet it is truly remarkable how little he says about these habits, and how almost exclusively he dwells on charity and the evangelical counsels. Still more remarkable is it, that in treating of the contemplative life, he quotes with agreement the

donum est. . . . Hujusmodi autem compassio seu connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem.” 2^a 2^m, q. 45, a. 2, 0.

“*Sapientia, de quâ loquimur, non potest esse cum peccato mortali.*” ib. a. 4, 0.

* “The understanding,” he proceeds [*i. e.* the *donum intellectûs*], “only conceives and penetrates. Wisdom judges and compares; it enables us to see causes, reasons, fitnesses; it represents to us God, His greatness, His beauty, His perfections, His mysteries, as *infinitely adorable and worthy of love*; and from this knowledge there results a *delicious taste*, which sometimes even extends to the body, and is greater or less according to the state of perfection and purity to which the soul has attained

“It is to the gift of wisdom that spiritual sweetnesses and consolations and sensible graces belong. . . . The taste of wisdom is sometimes so perfect, that a person, who is possessed of it, on hearing two propositions, the one formed by reasoning, the other inspired by God, will at once *distinguish between the two*; recognising that which comes from God, ‘*per quamdam objecti connaturalitatem.*’ Wisdom so fills the soul with a taste for goodness and the love of virtue, that it no longer feels any thing but disgust for other objects.” *Spiritual Doctrine*, principle 4, chap. iv.

statement of St. Gregory the Great, that such life *consists* in charity.* It has only a remote bearing indeed on our theme (if it has any at all), to consider the relative excellence of intellectus and will; yet as we have come so near to that subject, I may be allowed a very few words concerning it. Let such facts as these be considered: facts admitted quite as fully by St. Thomas, as by Scotus himself. The highest of all virtues is charity, a virtue of the will. The will possesses freedom of choice, and is accordingly the one origin of merit; while the intellectus is necessitated in its various operations. On our will, and on no other of our faculties, depends our eternal destiny: on our will it depends, in what degree we shall coöperate with grace, and in what fullness we shall correspond with God's vocation. Let such facts as these be well considered, and I cannot but think that Scotus's doctrine will be accepted as the truer, which regards the will as a higher and nobler faculty than the intellectus. I suppose St. Thomas's deference to Aristotle was so absolute on philosophical matters, that he never even permitted himself to entertain the question; yet he is not unfrequently led, by the very exigencies of Christian Doctrine, to use language which at least *appears* of very opposite tendency to Aristotle's. Thus, as we have already seen (see note to p. 35), he says (from Aristotle) that intellectus is higher than will; yet he adds (*not* from Aristotle) that it is a less high act to contemplate God than to love Him. Again he says (from Aristotle) that the virtutes intellectuales are more noble than the moral virtues; yet he adds (*not* from Aristotle) that the moral virtues are *simply* virtues, and that the virtutes intellectuales are only 'virtutes secundum quid.'† And other similar instances might be given.

I have now spoken sufficiently, on the consent of theologians in behalf of my proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in his moral and spiritual perfection. I have next to answer the objections, which have been zealously and ingeniously collected from various parts of theology, in antagonism to this proposition. One of them indeed has been answered a few paragraphs back; and the rest I will now proceed to consider.

Secondly then, a passage of Billuart has been objected, in which "perfectio naturæ quam Filius assumpsit" is stated to include perfectio

* "Propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei; inquantum scilicet aliquis, ex dilectione Dei, *inardescit ad Ejus pulchritudinem conspiciendam.*" 2^a 2^e, q. 180, a. 1, 0.

† Suarez says of these two statements, "*hæ duo partes conclusionis videntur inter se pugnare:*" though he tries to explain away the repugnance. *De Virtutibus*, d. 3, s. 2, n. 2.

intellectualis and a certain bodily perfection also. I have no doubt that the same phrase is to be found in very many theologians, with the same meaning ; but a moment's consideration will show how irrelevant is the objection. Our Blessed Lord of course has, and can have, no other *Personal* Perfection, excepting His Divine Perfections ; since He possesses human nature indeed, but no human personality. Such a passage therefore is actually serviceable, in answering other imaginable objections ; since it shows, that the phrase 'perfectio naturæ' is used by theologians to express, not personal perfection, but perfection of the various parts which constitute our nature.*

Thirdly, it has been objected that our Blessed Lady, and also Adam before the Fall, were most highly endowed with excellencies of the intellectus. Now, as I have already said, there are various excellencies of the intellectus, which are most intimately bound up with moral and spiritual perfection : I mean the possession in a high degree of faith, of the four *dona intellectualia*, and of prudence. It is the *virtutes intellectuales* other than prudence, which are *not* thus connected with spiritual perfection. The question therefore is, whether these *virtutes intellectuales* are represented by theologians, as being in any kind of way an integral part of Mary's and of Adam's personal perfection. And it so happens, that we can give a most conclusive answer to this question ; for Billuart quotes with agreement St. Antoninus's judgment, that Adam had them in a higher degree than Mary.† Consider the place assigned to Mary by Catholic theologians, a place so immeasurably exalted above that of any other creature ; and estimate by that consideration the extravagance of supposing, that any of them could place

* I am bound however to state, that my first Essay, as I read it, contained in several places the expression 'perfection of our nature' or 'of human nature,' to express 'our perfection' or 'human perfection.' Against the use of these *phrases*, the objection before us is undoubtedly valid ; as showing that they are used by theologians in quite a different sense. I had myself adopted them, merely to vary my expression ; for the context in every case (which I have not altered in the slightest degree) will show, that the idea intended was simply that of personal perfection. My *language* is now in as complete accordance with theological authority, as my *thoughts* were from the first.

† "Utrum Adam fuerit omnium hominum *sapientissimus* ?

De B. Virgine posset esse dubium, quod sic resolvimus cum S. Antonino. Quantum ad notitiam rerum supernaturalium et theologicarum, majorem habuit B. Virgo quam Adam. Quantum verò ad notitiam rerum materialium et civilium, majorem habuit Adam quam B. Virgo ; quia inter eas res plures sunt, quas B. Virginem scire nihil referebat, et *quæ in eâ fuissent superflua*." *De opere sex dierum*, diss. 4, a. 2.

Adam above Mary, in any particular appertaining ever so distantly to her personal perfection.

A fourth objection has been raised, which seems to me (I must say) extremely far-fetched: but as its originator attaches to it much importance, and as at all events it introduces theological questions of some interest, I will not decline his challenge. The objection is founded on a doctrine, held by a large number of theologians, that if A's intellectus exceeds B's in perspicacity and vigour, and if both are gifted with the same degree of 'lumen gloriæ,' A will see God more perfectly than B. I will call this the Scotist doctrine: not as being peculiar to the Scotists; but because it originated (I believe) with Scotus and is universally held in his school, while it is universally opposed by the opposite school, the Thomistical. This Scotist doctrine, however, may imaginably develop itself into two different shapes, which are most importantly contrasted with each other. It may imaginably be thought, that if A and B have accumulated on earth equal merits, they will receive in Heaven equal lumen gloriæ, and that A (having the keener intellectus) will see God more perfectly than B. It may be urged with some plausibility, that the Scotist doctrine, *if held in this particular shape*, is inconsistent with the proposition which I have advocated through the two Essays. For on this view, supposing B's *will* to have exerted itself as excellently as A's will, and equal merits to have been thus obtained, the keener intellectus would obtain the greater beatitude; and it might appear therefore, that such natural keenness of intellectus is an integral part of human perfection. But the Scotist doctrine may also be held quite differently. It may be fully admitted, that if A and B have equal merits, they will see God with equal perfection; but it may be held that this equality will be preserved, by God giving less lumen gloriæ to the keener intellectus, or by some other analogous mode.* In this latter shape, the doctrine has been held by very many theologians, and every Catholic has the fullest liberty to embrace it: but then, if thus held, I cannot even imagine what *appearance* of

* "Aliqui . . . docent, intellectum minùs perfectum habere à Deo majus lumen . . . si merita sint æqualia, ut possint æqualem visionem habere. Alii . . . utrumque intellectum habere æquale lumen, sed intellectum minùs perfectum magis à Deo elevari extrinsecè, et sic visionem utriusque esse æqualem. Alii . . . Deum impedire, ne lumen collatum intellectui perfectiori causet visionem perfectiorem." *Viva de Deo*, disp. 2, q. 4, n. 16.

Scotus himself is express in maintaining this. "Si in dispari intellectu repariatur habitus luminis æquè perfectus, *parem fore visionem utriusque*; quia perfectior intellectus non aget toto conatu." Apud Montefortino, 1, q. 12, a. 6, ad 4.

objection it furnishes against me. I will therefore confine my attention to the former of these two shapes, which the Scotist doctrine may imaginably assume.

The objection then will run thus. 'Some theologians maintain the thesis, that of two men with equal merits, he who possesses the keener intellectus will see God more perfectly. But this thesis contradicts the proposition, that man's perfection consists exclusively in perfection of his moral and spiritual nature. It cannot therefore be maintained, that this last proposition (whether true or no) is implied as *certain* by Catholic doctrine and practice.' I am now to argue against this objection.

And I at once reply confidently, that the thesis alleged is theologically unsound; even if it do not deserve a still severer censure. My direct reason for this statement, is the singularly clear and unequivocal decree put forth by the Council of Florence. That Council teaches, that those men who gain Heaven "*intueri clarè Ipsum Deum, Unum "et Trinum, sicuti est: pro meritorum tamen diversitate, aliud aliò "perfectiùs*" (Denz, n. 588). I find that, on two subsequent occasions, certain Easterns, desirous of admission into the Catholic Church, were required to use the very words, in their explicit profession of faith (n. 870, n. 875). No Catholic can be permitted, in defiance of this decree, to maintain that the superior perfectness in Heaven of one man's Vision over another's, depends on any thing except superiority of merit. If such a contradiction were permitted, I know not what definition of the Church could securely retain its one recognised and obvious meaning.

But there is a second reason also, which proves the thesis before us to be theologically unsound; viz. the *sensus fidelium*. The great body of well-instructed Catholics have learned, quite as a first principle, that our reward will be simply proportioned to our merits. I doubt if there is any one Catechism, expounding doctrine in any degree of detail, which does not state this truth as a matter of course; as a most certain and unquestioned part of Catholic doctrine.

To all this it is replied, that certain theologians of name and repute have nevertheless maintained the thesis, and have not been censured for doing so. But, before rejoining on this reply, I make two preliminary remarks. First, I believe that those who maintain the thesis are extremely few in number. I ground this statement, not merely on my own personal impression, but on two facts. F. Compton Carleton S.J. speaks of theologians as being *unanimously* against it.* And Mastrius,

* "*Hoc theologorum omnium sententiæ adversatur, qui planè renunt con-*

a very able Scotist who maintains it, is only able to quote six names in its behalf; not one (I think) being of any conspicuous eminence: Faber, Smisingius, Gallus, Poncius, Hiquæus, Lusitanus: (in 1 *Sent.* disp. vi. n. 192). My second preliminary remark is, that the Council of Florence speaks exclusively of human beings; it states that one *man* sees God more perfectly than another, according to the diversity of merits.* But those few theologians who advocate the thesis, are in general thinking principally, not of a comparison between one man and another, but between a man and an angel. The only writers with whom I happen to be acquainted, who hold the thesis which I oppose, are Viva, Henno, Frassen, and Mastrius. Now of the three former at least, what I have said is obviously true. Viva, in stating his question, asks, whether, for instance, an Angel sees God more clearly than a man, if both have equal lumen: and he uses no other instance throughout his argument.† Henno states it as the ‘*vulgaris philosophorum sententia*,’ that all *human* intellectus are equal; and if this opinion be admitted, of course the question cannot relate at all to a comparison between one *man’s* beatitude and another’s. Henno himself however seems rather to doubt this ‘*vulgaris sententia*.’ Frassen’s remarks are altogether similar to Henno’s.‡ This circumstance enables us to account for a fact, which is otherwise perplexing. Both Suarez and Billuart (to mention no others) oppose this thesis altogether, as

cedere Deum, qui præmium reddit ex justitiâ et instar coronæ, dare meritis æqualibus inæquale præmium.” Disp. 16, s. 2, n. 10.

* It speaks in the context of those who “*after Baptism* have incurred no stain of sin,” and of those who, “*having contracted such*, have undergone their full purgation.”

† “*Difficultas nunc est, utrûm visionum et beatitudinis inæqualitas unicè oriatur ex inæqualitate luminis elevantis, an etiam provenire possit ab inæqualitate intellectuum; ut proinde clariùs Deum videat angelus quàm homo, si uterque æquali lumine eleventur.*” *De Deo*, disp. 2, q. 4, n. 10.

And so throughout. Thus: “*ergo intellectus angelicus cum æquali lumine producit visionem perfectiorem quàm humanus,*” &c. &c. n. 11.

‡ “*Vult quidem Florentinum, quòd ubi sunt intellectus æqualis omninò perfectionis (quales esse omnes intellectus humanos supponit vulgaris philosophorum sententia et fortè etiam ipsum Concilium) &c. &c. . . . non tamen id definit, simpliciter, in supposito quòd intellectus sint inæqualis perfectionis:uales sunt intellectus humanus et angelicus, et fortè etiam duo intellectus humani.*” Henno *de Deo*, q. 4, disp. 9, concl. 2.

“*Ad Concilium Florentinum dico, ipsum esse intelligendum de facto, et secundum vulgarem sententiam philosophorum, asserentium substantias spirituales non habere majores vel minores gradus perfectionis; proindeque nullum intellectum esse ex se magis activum alio, sed tantum ratione dispositionis organorum dum corpori conjungitur.*” Frassen.

theologically unsound: yet neither of them quotes the Council of Florence in opposition. The reason of this is now manifest. The Council of Florence would only tell against the thesis, so far as it concerns a comparison between one man and another; but Suarez and Billuart, as their grounds of opposition show, maintain it to be unsound, even as it concerns that comparison between men and angels, which their opponents have mainly in view. Suarez says, that this thesis is *inconsistent with the principles of faith*; and Billuart, that it leads necessarily to a conclusion which is *worse than Pelagian*.*

I now proceed with my rejoinder. It is urged against me, that certain theologians of name and repute have nevertheless maintained this thesis, and have not been censured for doing so. Now I would first remind the reader of the 27th proposition, condemned by Alexander VII. "Si liber sit alicujus junioris et moderni, debet opinio censeri probabilis, dum non constet rejectam esse à sede Apostolicâ tanquam improbabilem." I most willingly admit, that the principle, which underlies the present objection, is very far from going the length of the condemned proposition. Yet surely it tends in that direction. And Viva, one of those writers whose opinion on the thesis before us I treat with disrespect, gives me very good ground for doing so, in his admirable commentary on the above proposition. Among other excellent remarks, are these:

"Ut opinio aliqua ob solam auctoritatem extrinsecam dici possit probabilis, debet pondus auctoritatis esse grave, tum secundum se, tum etiam *comparativè ad auctoritates quæ stant pro sententiâ oppositâ* Experientiâ teste, auctores moderni non rarò hallucinantur, sicut etiam antiqui non semel hallucinati sunt; etenim *pæne omnes proscriptæ propositiones*, antequàm à Pontifice damnarentur, auctoritate *non unius duntaxat* aut ex modernis aut ex antiquis fulciebantur: et tamen doctores communiter, etiam ante condemnationem Pontificiam, damnabant illas ut improbables et falsas. n. 3.

"Neque obstat, quòd libri, ante quàm in lucem prodeant, *sub oculos censorum cadant*. Sæpe enim librorum censores . . . non pollent eâ perspicaciâ quæ valeat opinionum laxitates taxare, et pondus rationum, juxta meritum, librare." n. 4.

* "Respondent aliqui, non esse inconveniens, ut qui habet æqualia merita perfectiùs videat ex perfectione et activitate sibi connaturali. . . . Sed hæc responsio est *parùm consona principiis fidei*: quia visio beatifica datur ut *merces filiorum Dei*, et ideò fieri non potest, ut aliquis absque pluribus meritis et majori gratiâ perfectiùs videat." Suarez *de Deo*, lib. ii. c. 21, n. 5.

"Sequeretur [ex hâc sententiâ] aliquem gradum gloriæ non correspondere gratiæ sed naturæ; et hominem per naturalia se discernere in spiritualibus: activitas enim et perspicacia major intellectûs creati . . . est beneficium naturæ et non gratiæ. Atqui hoc est contra [Scripturam], immò, *ut advertunt theologi, est plus quàm Pelagianum: pejus enim est,*" &c. Billuart *de Deo*, diss. 4, a. 8.

It may be said indeed, that though the thesis be not probable, I have no right on that account to call it unsound. Yet it is evident that neither Suarez nor Billuart had any hesitation whatever in doing so. And indeed a very little reflection will show, that the objector's implied principle, is not mistaken only, but monstrous.

In these non-theological days, it is somewhat difficult to realise the unintermitting activity, with which, some two hundred years ago (not to speak of earlier times), a multitude of able men devoted their whole mental energy to an exploration of scholastic questions. The number of theological conclusions (good, bad, and indifferent), which thus sprang up, is incredibly vast. One of these conclusions is fixed upon, which was advocated no doubt by theologians of name and mark, but by extremely few of them ;* which has been altogether confined to the scholastic arena, and never so much as heard of by the mass of well-educated Catholics. No one even dreams of alleging, that it was ever brought before the Holy Father's notice. But because he did not, *motu proprio*, single it out and condemn it, we are desired to infer that it enjoys his tacit acquiescence; and that this is ground sufficient, for our refusing the submission of faith to a direct definition of the Church, in its one straightforward and unequivocal meaning. I am very confident that no one on reflection will adhere to such a principle as this. Innocent XI.,—when condemning a third series of lax propositions, and dealing with a class of theories which for many years had occupied the most special attention of himself, of his predecessor, and of their theological examiners,—yet guards himself against being supposed to *approve* any proposition, which he does not expressly *condemn*.† But how vastly *more* unreasonable would it be, to suppose any kind of tacit approval in such a case as the present. I take my ground then on the definition of Florence.

* Ripalda has been objected as holding the thesis in question ; but on a careful examination of the sections quoted, I find the case to be quite otherwise. He does not so much as allude to the comparison between one *man* and another, nor accordingly does he refer to the Council of Florence at all. His own statement of his subject is as follows. “*Quærimus an actus supernaturales angelici necessariò sint perfectiores humanis (quòd à facultate naturali procedant essentialiter perfectiori), etiamsi cætera paria sint.*” *De Ente Supern.* disp. 37, præmium. And even as to *this* comparison, he considers that if an angel and a man have equal merits, they are also precisely equal as to their beatitude, and as to the explicitness with which they see the Divine Nature ; though in certain other respects, the angel's act of Vision is superior to the *man's*.

† “Non intendens Sanctitas Sua, per hoc decretum, alias propositiones, in

And this ground becomes even stronger (if indeed greater strength were possible) by considering the strange shifts to which those theologians resort, who reject the plain sense of this definition. Let me repeat its words. The Council decrees, that the souls of men, after death or purgatorial suffering as the case may be, "*intueri Deum Trinum et Unum sicuti est: pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectiùs.*" Viva replies, that the inequality of Vision is proportioned to the inequality of merit, *so far forth as the Vision is a reward*; but that *materially* it also depends on the inequality of intellectus: to which of course the obvious rejoinder lies, that the word 'reward' is not contained in the definition at all. Henno and Frassen treat the subject altogether similarly with each other, Frassen but expanding Henno's arguments. They give two different explanations of the decree. First, they say, it proceeds on the philosophical hypothesis commonly received, that human souls, separated from the body, are equal to each other in natural power. I have already explained how completely I admit, that the definition of Florence applies only to a comparison of man with man, not of man with angel: but as Henno and Frassen are unwilling, even on the comparison of man with man, to accept unreservedly its obvious sense, they proceed to give another explanation. Unequal merit, says Frassen, is one cause of unequal Vision, but *only* one cause; unequal intellectus (for any thing the decree says) may be another. A notable interpretation indeed! according to which it would follow, that I should not be contradicting the Council, if I maintained that our bodily health while on earth, our good family, our acquired wealth, are all so many causes of increased beatitude. But the most wonderful explanation of all is to be found in Mastrius: insomuch that were he not so considerable a theologian, we should be tempted to think he was indulging in a kind of jest. He quotes against himself Scripture, Fathers, and the Council of Florence; but replies, that those merits, on which the degree of beatitude depends, are partly indeed those of the beatus himself, but *partly those of Christ*. This, to explain not merely Scripture and Fathers, but the express words of Florence, "*pro meritorum diversitate alium alio perfectiùs*" !!!* Truly we may study

ipso non expressas, et Sanctitati Suae . . *exhibitas* vel exhibendas, ullatenùs approbare." Die 2 Martii 1679.

* " 'Beati vident Deum inæqualiter pro diversitate meritorum, quatenùs solùm pro diversitate meritorum visiones, *in quantum sunt formaliter præmia*, sunt inæquales' concedo: 'ita ut non possint esse *præmium materialiter inæquale pro diversitate intellectuum*' neg. antec. et conseq. . . Ratio autem cur sic explicanda sint verba Concilii, est, quia hoc fert connaturalitas luminis gloriæ, quòd causet

to some extent in the past, that process of explaining away the Church's definitions, which I have prognosticated (pp. 59-61), as not unlikely to be attempted on a far larger scale in time to come. It is no exaggeration at all to say, that if such artifices were permitted, an Arian might subscribe the Nicene Creed, and a Lutheran accept the decrees of Trent.

I repeat therefore, that the Council of Florence requires at our hands the submission of faith, in its obvious and unequivocal sense; a sense contradictory to that thesis, which has been alleged in objection to my argument. I cannot indeed admit that, even were the thesis permissible, the objection founded on it would possess any force or validity; but the thesis is so indubitably unsound, that it would be useless to pursue the matter further.

It may be better to add, that I am very far indeed from wishing to speak with any *general* disrespect, of the four theologians whom I have noticed. Towards Viva and Mastrius in particular, I entertain the sin-

visionem perfectiorem cum intellectu perfectiori, verba autem conciliorum . . . explicanda semper sunt in sensu excludente miraculum, quoad ejus fieri potest." *Viva de Deo*, d. 2, n. 16.

"Vult quidem Florentinum quòd ubi sunt duo intellectus æqualis omninò perfectionis, (quales esse omnes intellectus humanos supponit vulgaris philosophorum sententiâ, et fortè etiam ipsummet Concilium) unus altero perfectiùs Deum videat si majora sint merita, quia gloria datur proportionatè ad merita. Non tamen id definit simpliciter, in supposito quòd intellectus sint inæqualis perfectionis; quales sunt intellectus humanus et angelicus, et fortè etiam duo intellectus humani: quia hoc nihil faciebat ad ejus intentum; quod erat ostendere, majoribus meritis majorem reddi gloriam, minorem minoribus: quod et stat in nostrâ sententiâ." *Henno de Deo*, disp. 4, q. 9, concl. 2.

"Ad Concilium Florentinum dico, ipsum esse intelligendum de facto et secundum vulgarem sententiam philosophorum, asserentium substantias spirituales non habere majores vel minores gradus perfectionis; proindeque nullum intellectum esse ex se magis activum et vegetiorem altero, sed tantum ratione dispositionis organorum dum corpori conjungitur. Vel Concilium tantum assignare voluit causam sufficientem inæqualis beatitudinis, *non verò omnimodam*; sicut v. g. solito dicitur hominem clariùs videre altero, quia habet clariores et perfectiores oculos; licèt clavior visio nedum ex parte oculi vegetioris, sed etiam ex parte majoris luminis et præstantioris speciei visibilis interdum oriatur." *Frassen de Deo*, disp. 3, a. 7, s. 4. q. 2.

"Urgent adversarii unum absurdum sequi, majus omnibus illis, quia secundum Scripturas et Patres visio datur ut merces meritis correspondens . . . quod confirmat Concilium Florentinum, dicens visionem esse perfectiorem pro ratione meritorum . . .

"Opus non [est] ut tota visio respondeat *solis meritis propriis ipsius beati*, sed *vel propriis, vel Christi ex opere operato applicatis*." *Mastrius de Deo*, disp. 6, n. 202.

cerest admiration and gratitude. But it is fully consistent with such feelings to say, that in this one instance at least, they have not been proof against the temptation (so specially seductive to a scholastic mind) of following too eagerly and unreservedly their private philosophical theories ; and of not pausing fairly to consider, what the Church has really determined.

I have now replied to all the theological objections of which I am aware, as adduced or adducible against my proposition.

APPENDIX C.

ON A PASSAGE FROM SIR W. HAMILTON'S LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS.

AN objector considers that in p. 55 I have seriously misunderstood Sir W. Hamilton's drift. The whole argument on which I have insisted, from that part of my Essay onwards, is altogether independent of the passage in question ; and I might most easily therefore obviate the objection, by omitting the whole reference. But since a subsequent perusal has only confirmed my original opinion, that Sir William's meaning is most clearly and indubitably as I have represented it, I have thought it much better to retain my criticism and vindicate its justice. I will begin therefore by placing the whole passage before the reader, exactly as it stands in the original.

"In speculative knowledge, on the other hand, there may indeed, at first sight, seem greater difficulty ; but further reflection will prove that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity : 'Sordet cognita veritas' is a shrewd aphorism of Seneca. A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation. Every votary of science is wilfully ignorant of a thousand established facts,—of a thousand which he might make his own more easily than he could attempt the discovery of even one. But it is not knowledge,—it is not truth,—that he principally seeks ; he seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings ; and, as in following after the one he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable energy than in taking formal possession of the thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many, and prefers the chances of the one. Accordingly, the sciences always studied with keenest interest are those in a state of progress and uncertainty : absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study ; and the last worst calamity that could befall man, as he is at present constituted, would be that full and final possession of speculative

truth, which he now vainly anticipates as the consummation of his intellectual happiness.

‘Quæsitæ cœlo lucem, ingemuitque repertâ.’

“But what is true of science is true, indeed, of all human activity. ‘In life,’ as the great Pascal observes, ‘we always believe that we are seeking repose, while, in reality, all that we ever seek is agitation.’ When Pyrrhus proposed to subdue a part of the world, and then to enjoy rest among his friends, he believed that what he sought was possession, not pursuit; and Alexander assuredly did not foresee that the conquest of one world would only leave him to weep for another world to conquer. It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in hunting; thus it is in the search of truth; thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does not satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us.

‘[Nullo votorum fine beati]

Victuros agimus semper, nec vivimus unquam.’

‘Man never is, but always to be blest.’

“The question, I said, has never been regularly discussed,—probably because it lay in too narrow a compass; but no philosopher appears to have ever seriously proposed it to himself, who did not resolve it in contradiction to the ordinary opinion. A contradiction of this opinion is even involved in the very term Philosophy; and the man who first declared that he was not a *σοφὴς*, or possessor, but a *φιλόσοφος*, or seeker of truth, at once enounced the true end of human speculation, and embodied it in a significant name. Under the same conviction Plato defines man ‘the hunter of truth,’ for science is a chase, and in a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the game.

‘Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim
At objects in an airy height;
But all the pleasure of the game
Is afar off to view the flight.’

“‘The intellect,’ says Aristotle, in one passage, ‘is perfected, not by knowledge but by activity;’ and in another, ‘The arts and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge.’ Descending to the schoolmen: ‘The intellect,’ says Aquinas, ‘commences in operation, and in operation it ends;’ and Scotus even declares that a man’s knowledge is measured by the amount of his mental activity—‘*tantum scit homo, quantum operatur.*’ The profoundest thinkers of modern times have emphatically testified to the same great principle. ‘If,’ says Malebranche, ‘I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it.’ ‘Did the Almighty,’ says Lessing, ‘holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left *Search after Truth*, deign to tender me the one I might prefer,—in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request *Search after Truth*.’ ‘*Truth*,’ says Von Müller, ‘is the property of God, the pursuit of truth is what belongs to man;’ and Jean Paul Richter: ‘It is not the goal, but the course, which makes us happy.’ But there would be no end of similar quotations.

“But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of intellectual activity, those studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion,

will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently to a less improving exercise. On this ground I would rest one of the pre-eminent utilities of mental philosophy. That it comprehends all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and moral interest; that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and the future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced from the philosophy of mind, will be at once admitted. But I do not at present found the importance on the paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind,—as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively, conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that I would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them.” *Lectures on Metaphysics*, pp. 10-14.

The first question to be answered is this: what does the author intend by ‘speculative knowledge’? I reply, that he intends one or other of these two things; and it is quite immaterial to my purpose, which. He may possibly use the term in a larger sense, to include a scientific knowledge of physical facts. Or else (which is more probable) he may confine his meaning to metaphysical and psychological knowledge, in the largest sense of those terms; so far at least as such knowledge is derived from natural (as distinct from supernaturally revealed) data.* At all events, the pursuit of ‘speculative knowledge’ very prominently includes a study of that ‘mental philosophy,’ from which ‘every natural conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and the future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced.’ (See last paragraph of the above passage.) It is important to make this point clear, because of a paragraph immediately preceding the passage which I have quoted.

“Knowledge is either practical or speculative. In practical knowledge it is evident that truth is not the ultimate end; for in that case knowledge is, *ex hypothesi*, for the sake of application. The knowledge of a moral, of a political, of a religious, truth, is of value only as it affords the preliminary or condition of its exercise.

In speculative knowledge, on the other hand,” &c. as above.

A reader, unacquainted with Sir William’s system, might suppose that in this paragraph he is speaking of practical *philosophy*, as distinct from speculative. But nothing can be more alien from his drift, than such an interpretation. For this statement of mine (as it is essential to my argument that the point be made clear), I will give three different reasons, any one of which would be sufficient. First, in this very

* My chief reason for thinking the latter sense more probable, is a passage in p. 121. “Science and philosophy are conversant either about mind or about matter. *The former of these is philosophy properly so called.*”

volume (p. 113), he “regards the division of *philosophy* into *theoretical and practical* as *unsound*.” Secondly, in the paragraph just quoted, he speaks of a “moral” and a “political truth.” But “moral and political *philosophy*” are expressly mentioned by him in p. 125, as branches of “rational psychology;” which every one will call a speculative science, if there be such in the world. Thirdly, in the paragraph just quoted he also speaks of a “religious truth.” But in the passage which I am mainly criticising, he includes “mental philosophy” under the head of “speculative truth:” and then expressly says, that from this mental philosophy, “every natural conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced.” So far, therefore, as religious truth is obtainable from philosophy *at all*, it is obtainable (according to our author) from *speculative* philosophy.

Sir W. Hamilton’s meaning therefore, in the paragraph last quoted, is abundantly clear. He is not speaking therein of those who are investigating ‘moral, political, and religious truth’ *scientifically*; but of those who desire it for purely practical purposes, and seek to obtain it (as occasion arises) from any accessible source. Under the head of speculative knowledge, therefore, (to repeat what I have already said), he is speaking either of all philosophical knowledge, or of all except physical science.

So much, then, having been determined, a second question arises: have I in my Essay correctly stated the author’s doctrine? I cannot see so much as an opening for doubt on the matter. He does not even take the trouble of stating,—he implies throughout as a well-known and familiar fact,—that philosophers (as a matter of course) are determined to the special direction of their investigations, simply by their own pleasure and intellectual interest. If his picture of them is to be accepted, they never dream of considering, what special line of investigation will be most pleasing to their Creator; they never dream of considering, what special inquiries will most redound to the glory of God and the best interests of man; they follow, with the blindness of an instinct, that one path, which promises them the greatest personal pleasure and amusement. Let us begin with the first paragraph, and see how simply this is implied throughout. I start from line 5. “A truth once known is prized”—not because of any glory to God, or benefits to mankind, which may be derivable from its knowledge; but—“as opening up” fresh fields of pleasure to the inquirer. A “votary of science,” by acquainting himself with “a thousand established facts,” might do important service to God and man in their dissemination. But “*it is*

not knowledge, it is not truth, that he principally seeks;" nor yet the inestimable benefits which accrue from knowledge and from truth. No: he thinks, neither of God, nor of his fellow-men; but of himself. "*He seeks the exercise of his faculties and feelings; and as in following after one, he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable energy than in taking formal possession of the thousand, he disdains*" to aim at any other end than his own pleasurable energy. "Accordingly the sciences *always* studied with keenest interest" are not at all those which promise the greatest fruit, spiritual, moral, or even temporal; but are those which, as being "in a state of progress and uncertainty," are thought likely to abound in intellectual excitement and titillation to the inquirer himself.

The second paragraph makes our author's meaning even plainer, if greater plainness were possible. Those portentously selfish heathens, Pyrrhus and Alexander, knew not God, and loved not man; they aimed but at selfish aggrandisement and selfish repose. Sir William is of opinion, that all philosophers resemble in this respect Pyrrhus and Alexander. And he then proceeds to imply, quite as a matter of course, that pleasurable excitement is as exclusively the one end desired in the 'search of truth,' as in 'play' or in 'hunting.' Indeed 'hunting' is a favourite illustration with him of the matter in hand: for he returns to it, and at greater length, in the third paragraph; and that with a drift entirely similar.

Sir W. Hamilton teaches indeed, as I must readily admit, that this pleasure is mainly or entirely derived, from the exercise of our intellectual faculties: using that word 'intellectual' in its ordinary English sense. It follows, therefore, that philosophers, in seeking pleasure, necessarily cultivate those faculties, and thus (in his opinion) "manifest the glory of their Creator" (p. 5). On the latter part indeed of this statement, I have already commented at the end of Appendix A. But this statement is in no respect incompatible with the other, and he evidently expresses both. His position on the whole is this: that philosophers, in pursuing their intellectual pleasures, cultivate their 'highest' faculties, and thus '*manifest*' God's glory. But to say this, is as different as possible from saying, that in their intellectual labours they *seek*, or *think of*, God's glory. It is imaginable no doubt in the abstract, that philosophers may seriously deliberate on the question, whether God's glory be most promoted by scientific *truth* or by scientific *self-cultivation*; and that, having decided for the latter alternative, they are animated in their studies by earnest zeal for their Creator. This, I say, is imaginable in the abstract; but no one will say that Sir William's

account of them has the remotest similarity to any such description. If we trust his picture of them, we shall consider that they are no more animated by zeal for God in their *researches*, than were Pyrrhus and Alexander in their *conquests*. He represents them as led unresistingly by the blind impulse of present intellectual gratification.

Two questions then have been answered : one more remains. How far is the author correct, when he cites certain grave authorities in confirmation of his view ? And in one instance the question is vital ; for if St. Thomas, a canonised Saint, really held such a principle, my condemnation of it recoils on my own head. But there is nothing more wonderful, in all this wonderful passage, than his appeal to St. Thomas. The more carefully we read over the few words which he ascribes to the Angelic Doctor, the more difficult we shall find it to understand, what Sir William could have imagined to be their connexion with his theme. "The intellect commences in operation, and in operation it ends." Why, so far would St. Thomas be from implying any *philosophical* process by such words, that (in his doctrine) not only contemplation on earth, but the Vision of God in Heaven, is an 'operation of the intellectus.'* However, we need not trouble ourselves to consider what St. Thomas would mean by these words, for in point of fact he never wrote them. This Sir William's editors are obliged to admit ; they add, however, that "this is *perhaps* the substance of i. q. 79, a. 2 and a. 3." I would only beg the reader to look through those two articles, and see what can be their possible connexion, either with Sir William's supposed analysis of them, or with Sir William's argument. I should add however, that nothing can be further from my mind, than the least suspicion of intentional misquotation. Sir W. Hamilton possessed most extraordinary erudition, and (I believe) very considerable memory ; but the latter no doubt occasionally played him false, when he thought he could trust it.

Scotus is also quoted by our author, as supporting his views ; and though Scotus is not a canonised Saint, yet his authority as a theologian is so extremely great, that it would undoubtedly be a most serious objection to my argument, if he could *truly* be so quoted. But here again I am lost in simple amazement, when I try to imagine, what connexion with his own argument Sir W. Hamilton could have had in view. I quote the full passage, as supplied by the editors in a note.

"Scire in actu est, quum aliquis cognoscit majorem et minorem, et simul cum

* See, *e. g.*, 1^a 2^m, q. 3, a. 2, 3, 4, 5.

hoc, applicat præmissas ad conclusionem. Sic igitur patet, quòd actualitas scientiæ est ex applicatione causæ ad effectum."

I am quite unable to make any comment on this passage, from my inability to conjecture for what purpose it is adduced.

There is a third Catholic writer of some name, Mallebranche, whom Sir W. Hamilton quotes. For the sake of Mallebranche's reputation, I sincerely trust that Sir William has as completely misconceived him, as he has misconceived St. Thomas and Scotus. And I observe with pleasure, that the editors are not able to quote from *him* any passage, which contains the opinion in question; but only one from another writer, *ascribing* to him that opinion.*

As to that most overpraised man Pascal, it cannot be important for the Catholic cause to defend *him* against any imputation: though of him, as of every other human being, we should hope the best. Passages are quoted from him, which undoubtedly seem to bear out Sir W. Hamilton's statement.†

None of the other authors quoted by Sir W. Hamilton (I believe) even professed Catholicism.

* The editors' reference is this. "Malebranche disait avec une ingénieuse exagération, 'Si je tenais la vérité captive dans ma main, j'ouvrirais la main afin de poursuivre encore la vérité.'" Mazure, *Cours de Philosophie*.

† "Rien ne nous plaît que le combat, mais non pas la victoire. . . . *Ainsi dans le jeu, ainsi dans la recherche de la vérité.* On aime à voir dans les disputes le combat des opinions; mais de contempler la vérité trouvée, point du tout. . . . *Nous ne cherchons jamais les choses, mais la recherche des choses.*"

THE END.

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